

THE HASTIE LECTURES

1909-1911

RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN HOLLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

BY

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MCMXI

IN MEMORY OF
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. . . Oneindig eeuwig Wezen
 van alle ding, dat wezen heeft.
 Vergeef het ons, o nooit volprezen
 van al wat leeft of niet en leeft,
 nooit uitgesproken noch te spreken !
 Vergeef het ons, en scheld ons kwijt
 dat geen verbeelding, tong noch teeken
 u melden kan. Gij waart, gij zijt,
 Gij blijft dezelfde. Alle Englenkennis
 en uitspraak, zwak, en onbekwaam,
 is maar ontheiliging en schennis ;
 want ieder draagt zijn eigen naam,
 behalve gij. Wie kan u noemen
 bij uwen Naam ? Wie wordt gewijd
 tot uw Orakel ? Wie durft roemen ?
 Gij zijt alleen dan die Gij zijt ;
 uzelv' bekend, en niemand nader.
 U zulks te kennen, als gij waart
 der eeuwigheden glans en ader :
 Wien is dat licht geopenbaard ?
 Wien is der glansen glans verschenen ?
 dat zien is nog een hooger heil
 Dan wij van uw genade ontleenen ;
 dat overschrijdt het perk, en peil
 van ons vermogen. Wij verouden
 in onzen duur ; gij nimmermeer.
 Uw wezen moet ons onderhouden.
 Verheft de Godheid ! Zingt haar eer.
VONDEL, *Lucifer*.

PREFACE

THIS volume contains a series of five lectures which I delivered, as Hastie Lecturer, in the University of Glasgow, in February of the present year. The object of the Hastie Lectureship is to encourage the study of theology among the ministers of the Church of Scotland. I had several reasons for choosing as my special subject of study the movements of Religious Thought in Holland during the last century.

As minister for six years of the English churches of Middelburg and Flushing—churches of much historical interest, which have long been incorporated into the Dutch Reformed Church—I had been led to give a good deal of time to the study of the subject. While the questions and problems that Dutch theologians have been dealing with during the period covered by my survey are, of course, fundamentally the same as those that

have been occupying our minds on this side of the North Sea, there is a certain interest in seeing how men of a different mental type, living under different ecclesiastical conditions, have been dealing with them.

In itself the work of recent Dutch theologians is highly valued by scholars of other countries who have made acquaintance with it—the names of Professor Cheyne and the late Professors Pfleiderer and Hastie may be mentioned, who have all expressed regret that it should be so little known outside Holland. The principal works of Tiele and Kuenen—men of world-wide reputation—have been translated, and some of them originally appeared in an English dress, and I have not thought it necessary to devote much space to them in my lectures, confining myself mainly to an attempt to indicate their position in the general movement of thought in Holland. I had intended to notice the work of Professor Bavinck—Dr Kuyper's loyal and learned theological henchman—before concluding my final lecture. I may give as an excuse for omitting the name of the ablest living writer

on Dogmatics in Holland, that Dr Bavinck is still a comparatively young man, and that his place, therefore, belongs to the present rather than to the past century.

I remark in my First Lecture that the main interest in the study of religious thought in Holland during the period dealt with, centres in the question of Church and Doctrine. This is an additional reason, I think, for regarding the subject as having a certain fitness for a lectureship founded to commemorate a professor of divinity or systematic theology. I have made no attempt to draw lessons, bearing on present-day questions among ourselves, from the story I have tried to tell. I may say however, that I have found it, in this respect, suggestive, and possibly some who may take the trouble to read my book may do the same.

In what is necessarily merely a sketch of a very wide subject, I have had to leave unnoticed many important writers, some of whose books I have read with interest. I take this opportunity of gratefully mentioning the name of Dr Bronsveld, of Utrecht, whose

monthly *causerie* in *Stemmen voor Waarheid en Vrede* is always delightful reading. Dr Bronsveld has the secret of never writing anything that is not humanly interesting, and he has Dr Johnson's merit of being a good hater. In his last month's *Stemmen*—it is an indication of the trend of thought at the present day—he states that he was very much struck by the fact that two “Liberal” professors had lately been pressing the claims of Dogmatics upon theologians. One of them wished a more modest place to be assigned to the Philosophy of Religion, and more time and attention devoted to what Christianity specifically teaches.

So far as I know, there is no book in English on the subject treated of in the following lectures. Students who do not read Dutch can find an account of the theological tendencies in Holland, during the early half of the century, in the elder Chantepie de la Saussaye's *La crise religieuse en Hollande, Souvenirs et impressions*, published in 1860, and in an article in the *Revue des deux Mondes* (1859) by Albert Réville, entitled

Les Controverses et les écoles religieuses en Hollande. For this period I am also indebted to Christiaan Sepp's *Proeve eener Pragmatische Geschiedenis der Theologie in Nederland* (1787-1858), and to Alard Pierson's *Oudere Tijdgenooten*. For the later half-century *De Modern-Godstienstige Richting in Nederland*, by Dr Herderscheê, I have found useful, and also the younger Chantepie de la Saussaye's *Geestlijke Stroomingen*—a deeply interesting collection of essays. Students who are specially interested in early Christian literature will find an account of what has been done in this subject in *Het Nieuwe Testament Sedert 1859*, by Van Manen (1886), of which there is a German translation. I have also read almost all the theological articles in the leading literary journals—the *Gids* and the *Tijdspiegel*. Fifty or sixty years ago they were much more numerous than latterly. My lectures are, however, mainly based on an independent study of the works of the leading theological writers, and some of them are mentioned in the course of the narrative.

I close with some words of Christiaan Sepp—one of my earliest guides in this field—which he found quite reconcilable with a conviction of the imperative need, for the sake of the Church, of clearness and definiteness in the science of Dogmatics—the science of the Faith of the Church: “Mijn blik heeft gerust op vele en velerlei menschen en boeken, meeningen en rigtingen. Ik heb het weer duidelijk leeren inzien, dat wij menschen niets scheppen, niets voortbrengen, en de eeuwige waarheid die uit U is, mijn God! door ons slechts in gebrekkigheid van klanken kan worden uitgesproken en in onvolkomenheid van denkvormen voorgedragen. Ons denken is phantaseeren; Uw denken is doen. Wij slijten, wij verouderen, wij vergaan; 't schijnt wel in deze eeuw als met versnelde vaart. Menschen en meenigen gaan ras voorbij! Het getimmerte van onze stelsels valt ineen! Uw gebouw, de kerk Uws zoons, wel staat zij vast!”

FOCHABERS, *August 28, 1911.*

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THE REVOLUTION AND THE RÉVEIL

THE REVOLUTION AND THE RÉVEIL

IN beginning a series of lectures on Dutch Theology, I can claim to be merely following a Dutch academic fashion if I say a few words about my personal connection with the theologian in memory of whom the Lectureship I now hold was founded. Beneath their somewhat formal ways the Dutch are a warm-hearted and an open-hearted people, and on certain occasions—the delivery of an opening academic lecture is one—they allow themselves more liberty in expressing their personal feelings than is customary among ourselves.

The nature of my subject—an historical sketch of the course of religious thought in Holland during the last century, in which I will leave the Dutch theologians, for the most part, to criticise one another—absolves me from the necessity of conforming to another custom. In Holland, where theological interest

is exceedingly keen and opinion on the subject much divided, a divinity lecturer is expected to indicate at the outset the school or *richting* to which he belongs. And this he generally does, but not always. A professor at Groningen, who flourished before the period I am dealing with, began his first course with a lecture on Philadelphia, but the polemical writings that soon flowed in rapid succession from his pen became so numerous that he was actually obliged to set up a private printing-press.

My friendship with the late Professor of Divinity in this University goes a long way back, to the summer of 1874, when we met at Göttingen. Hastie had already a pretty wide acquaintance with Continental University life, Dutch as well as German, and was even then interested, as I can remember, in the subject I have undertaken to treat of. It was my first visit to Germany, and although my relation to him was that of a much younger student to one who stood incomparably above him, we became close friends, and with some pretty long intervals of silence, remained so to the end. "What memories of Germany and of India,"

he wrote to me a short time before his death—as it happened we were ordained and sailed for India about the same time—"what memories of Germany and of India your letter calls up, and all of them pleasant." When I became acquainted with Hastie, early in the session, I had a letter in my possession, an introduction from Robertson Smith to the famous theologian Ritschl, which was then weighing on my mind. Ritschl's manner in the class-room was magisterial, and the look with which he surveyed his auditory was not always, like that of the Göttingen professor, whom we all know, "well-nigh celestial." A shy young man, with a most imperfect command of the German tongue, the sense of which was deepened by daily hearing from my instructress of the achievements of a brilliant young countryman of mine, who was also her pupil, and whose name I shall presently have to mention, for a certain relation of his, as we shall see, had much to do, in a roundabout way, with the development of Dutch theology during the nineteenth century—I was looking forward to a meeting with Ritschl with interest indeed, but not without some trepidation.

Much to my relief, Hastie gladly agreed to my proposal that we should visit the great man together. This was the year in which the third volume of Ritschl's *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, in which he expounded his theological system, had appeared, and Hastie, who kept himself abreast of foreign theological literature and spoke German fluently, was soon engaged in an animated discussion with the author on the subject of his book. All I can remember, and all that is necessary for my purpose in recalling the incident, is that he warmly praised a book on the same subject that an Edinburgh professor had recently published, and offered to send a copy of it to Ritschl, an offer that was courteously accepted, and was the beginning—Hastie told me many years afterwards—of much friendly intercourse between them. On leaving Ritschl's house together—I speak to my shame—I expressed my surprise that he should value so highly a book that seemed to me to be behind the times. He replied that the book, which I had not read—Dr Crawford on the *Atonement*—had distinct merits of its own, and that in any

case, it would be a fatal mistake for a student of theology to neglect the writers of his own country. Most of Dr Hastie's literary work had for its aim to make us acquainted with the thought of other lands, and I need not say that he regarded this as of great importance ; but he would have agreed with the saying of Chantepie de la Saussaye the elder—perhaps the most thoughtful of the Dutch theologians of the last century, and at present, by his writings, perhaps the most influential—that “a people as well as an individual loses the capacity of being enriched with the endowments of others when they make light of their own.” Dr Hastie did not believe in exotic theology—his Inaugural Lecture as Professor of Divinity in this University made that very plain. Of the fact that he was deeply interested in Scottish theology and in our national religious life and history, in which our theology must be rooted, the first series of the Hastie Lectures, Dr Macmillan's *Aberdeen Doctors*, is a lasting memorial. In studying Dutch theology I was often reminded of the early lesson I learned from my old friend. The chief characteristic

of the Dutch is, I think, an intense national consciousness. Their writers take a kind of artistic delight in portraying their spiritual physiognomy. The subject seems to have an irresistible fascination for them, and neither poet, novelist, nor divine can keep from it. We Dutch are this, and that, and not something else, is an ever-recurring formula in Dutch literature. The idea of a popular or collective consciousness which is much in vogue at the present day among a school of French psychologists—an idea that the French editor of the younger Chantepie de la Saussaye's *History of Religions* describes as "obscure, ill-defined, but exceedingly fertile"—is one on which Dutch literature might throw some light. The Dutch are a realistic people, and paint the shadows as well as the lights in their national character, and the former, I have sometimes thought, with even more gusto and with a curious subtlety. It is an article of a Dutchman's creed that this character can only be appreciated by a genuine Dutchman. La Saussaye belonged to a family that had been settled for several generations in Holland, and

had Dutch blood in his veins. Most of his life he was, as described by Loman, "a fighter standing alone," and this fact some writers have attempted to explain on the theory that his French origin made him incapable of fully sympathising with the Dutch character. Of Da Costa, a poet of Jewish race and a prominent figure in the religious movement we have presently to consider, Alard Pierson says that he was never really popular—never became *our* Da Costa, because he had a passion for ideas, which is alien to a people like the Dutch, who indulge in their common talk in the use of diminutives. It is said by ethnologists that there is a considerable Celtic strain in the Dutch race; but if so, it certainly does not appear in their mental character. If it is the character of that race, as we are told on good authority, "to be doomed and yet privileged to live in that confused land, where the real and the imaginary, the practical and the impossible intertwine," there is little of the Celt in the Dutchman. What they boast of above all is the possession of sound understanding and mental sobriety. The glamour of the Celt

- Da Costa

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is not to their taste. They like to see things clearly, and to see them as they are—at least, as they seem to be to men of sound understanding, “We are a people of dykes and dams,” a Dutch writer said recently, “both as to our land and our mental life.” And Dr Kuyper’s often-quoted saying about the danger of “blurring the boundary lines” is characteristically Dutch. It might seem that such a type of mind is perhaps not the best fitted to deal with such a subject as religion, but if we are to treat theology as science, and accept the old saying that *qui bene distinguit bene docet*—a favourite maxim of theirs—much, I believe, can be learned from a people who have a remarkable gift of making distinctions, wrought into their nature, possibly, by many centuries of unremitting toil in making and holding that distinction between land and sea, which to them is a matter of life and death. Another feature, not unconnected with what I have been saying, that has affected the development of theology in Holland, is that, while not uninterested in what is going on in the

theological world around them, they are not easily or quickly moved by influences from without. To illustrate this, I shall quote what Christiaan Sepp wrote fifty years ago, in answer to the question, "Is the translation of foreign works entirely favourable to the growth of theological science at home?" His answer is that it is not. Apart from the fact that to this learned divine a theologian without a knowledge of ancient and modern languages is like the Knight of the Rueful Countenance, he holds that every people has naturally its own individuality, and that every writer has something that hangs together with the people he belongs to, and that another people cannot assimilate, at least not profitably. The scientific life of every people, he goes on to say, just like that of the individual man, has an organic development, the regular process of which is really hindered by disturbances that come from without.

Another feature I shall notice before passing on to consider the actual movement of religious thought in Holland, is the close connection in the Dutch mind between religious thought and

the Church. In their highest flights—and sometimes from the point of view of traditional theology they fly pretty high—they keep the church steeple in sight. The great lesson, La Saussaye says, that Clarisse taught him when he was a student at Leiden was that the theologian was the servant of the Church, and that the object of his science was the Church of Christ. And in 1868, on the occasion of the Tercentenary of the Synod of Wezel, in an address on the connection between German and Dutch theology, he says that while the former can enrich the latter with its scientific results, Dutch theology has something to offer in return in regard to what is distinctively ecclesiastical. A further illustration of the same tendency may be seen, I think, in the fact that when the Modernist movement rose to its height in the sixties of last century, the question resolved itself into the hotly discussed ecclesiastical question, “Shall they stay, or must they go?” From the nature of the case, therefore, it will be necessary in these lectures to deal largely with the question of Church and Doctrine, or rather to see how

the Dutch have been dealing with it. While we shall have to notice in our historical survey the principal contributions made by Dutch scholars to the sciences of biblical criticism, comparative religion, and the psychology and philosophy of religion, our main interest will be centred on the question of Church and Doctrine as affected by these results.

When I went to reside in Holland, on my return from India ten years ago, I confess I knew very little about the subject I have undertaken to give some account of. The translated works of Kuenen and Tiele, men of world-wide reputation, I had read with interest. Scholten, when I took him up in Holland, seemed somehow to be not unfamiliar, but Dr Kuyper was little more than a name, and I had never even heard of the *Doleantie*. In my first walks among the picturesque villages of Walcheren, I noticed with special interest the old churches, plastered thickly within and without, but still retaining their pre-Reformation core. On some conspicuous place outside the church, in bright-coloured letters, the useful but somewhat suggestive

information is usually given that the local fire-hose is to be found within. Not far from the old church a modern ecclesiastical building is usually to be seen, perhaps the only æsthetically unpleasing object in the whole landscape.

I soon learned that the old church was *Herformd*, and the new *Gereformeerd*, and that, while the two words have the same meaning, there was between them a great gulf fixed. The fact that the founder of the latter denomination was a learned divine, who was then Prime Minister of Holland in a Coalition Government of Calvinists and Romanists, that he or his admirers boasted that he had exorcised the *Fata Morgana*, as he terms it, of Modernism from Dutch theology, and that the same fate was already hanging over an ethical school of theology of which I knew at the time as little as I did of Dr Kuyper—all this was enough to excite one's curiosity. The tendency of a long residence in India, where Christianity appears visibly as minute spots against a vast background of Hinduism and Islamism, is perhaps to make one view it in what seem to be its simpler and

more radical elements, and the task of finding one's way among the "dykes and dams" of Dutch theology was at first not without some difficulty. I found the subject, however, exceedingly interesting. Whether I can succeed in making it so to others is another matter.

While Holland, politically, at the beginning of the century was caught up and swept along for a time by the whirlwind of the French Revolution, the movement seems to have had little influence on the religious thought of the country. In looking over the files of the *Middelburg Courant* of those days, I was struck by the fact that at a certain date, when the French troops came to the town, the paper appeared with the heading, *Vrijheid, Gelijkheid, en Broederschap*, presently to assume a more familiar form as the French grip tightened, but the speeches of the Dutch revolutionary leaders, among whom was Van der Palm, who is regarded as the typical theologian of the period, dwell on the manifest leadings of Divine Providence in the events which were taking place. "The voice is

Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau." While our own poets were almost all carried away by the enthusiasm of the time, Bilderdijk, the one great Dutch poet of the time, and perhaps of the century, who was closely connected with the religious movement called the *Réveil*, which we have presently to consider, was inspired all his life by a fierce hatred of revolutionary ideas. In 1796 the National Church was disestablished, and the theological faculty in the Universities was absorbed in a philosophical faculty, from which the subject of dogmatics was excluded. A few years later the theological faculty was placed on its former footing, and remained thus until its reorganisation in 1876, when dogmatics was again excluded from the faculty, and handed over to the Church to be taught within the walls of the University and at the cost of the State. In 1816, when the Orange family was restored, the Church was reorganised, without, however, regaining its former privileged position.

Besides that of Van der Palm, who became Professor of Semitic Languages at Leiden,

the names of Clarisse at Leiden, Heringa at Utrecht, and Muntinghe at Groningen may be mentioned as the leading theologians in the early years of the century. Leiden has always been renowned for its Hebrew scholars. It was not, however, so much by his learning as by his singularly beautiful style, simple and dignified, that Van der Palm was distinguished. As a student he was more given to *kolven* than to study, a game that has at least a certain historical affinity to our golf. His *Bible for the Young* was one of the first Dutch books I read. It is not a crammed little text-book, like those of our degenerate age, but a substantial and spacious work in twenty-four volumes. What Clarisse said of him, that he was a *theologus biblicus non dogmaticus*, may be said of all this group. While not controverting the doctrine of the Church, the tendency of the time was to try to smooth away its sharp edges. Tired of the scholasticism of early Dutch theology, the endless discussions of the Voetians and Cocceians, refuge was sought in a kind of Biblical theology. Biblical theology as a

science was still far in the distance. The historical criticism of the books of the Bible, without which Biblical theology is impossible, made little way in Holland before the middle of the century. When the usually placid Van der Palm heard in his old age that a pupil of his had adopted the theory of a Second Isaiah, he is said to have broken his pipe in consternation. The school of thought represented by the theologians I have named was in vogue until well into the second quarter of the century. It is known as that of rationalistic-supernaturalism, and its main defects in the eyes of later Dutch theologians are its "halfness and its indefiniteness." La Saussaye, who began his theological studies at Leiden in 1836 under Clarisse, Van Hengel, and later under Van Oordt, a representative of the rising Groningen school, describes this theology as a mitigated orthodoxy. The Bible was regarded, he says, as the supreme authority; the historical character of its narratives and the infallibility of its teaching were maintained; only it neglected to show precisely the nature of that authority and the essence of those

revelations. It did not feel the need of taking account of the relations that exist between the revelations and the world as an organic whole. It troubled itself as little about the question how miracle is in accordance with the laws of nature as about the question how inspiration is in accordance with the laws of the human understanding. In short, the psychological and cosmological conditions of Revelation were neglected. The miracles of the Bible were accepted as historical, while it attempted to explain them as far as possible naturally. Thus Van der Palm, in the book I have mentioned, is of opinion that the stoppage of the Jordan, which enabled the Israelites to cross dry-shod, may have been caused by a mass of rock falling across its bed higher up its course and temporarily damming it ; while the fall of the wall of Jericho might easily be caused by a simultaneous shout from tens of thousands of throats, especially if it happened to be old and badly built to begin with.

The attitude of a people in regard to the question of religious education in the schools is

a good index to its religious thought. At least this has been markedly the case in Holland. Early in the century Van der Palm was appointed by the Revolutionary Government to a post corresponding to that of a Director of Public Instruction, and the system of religious education he introduced was in force for a full generation. Social and Christian morals were to be taught in the public schools, but not the Church catechisms, and there were no private schools. It may be added that Hygienics, in connection with the schools, was a subject that received considerable attention from Van der Palm. For a time this system seems to have satisfied all the Churches, even the Roman Catholic, which had secured substantial benefits from the rearrangement of Church property. There was a good deal of fraternisation among the Churches, partly due, at first, to revolutionary ideas, but more so to the indefiniteness of the reigning theology. Church union was in the air. Reformed, Remonstrant, and Lutheran clergymen preached in one another's pulpits, and societies were formed outside the Churches to further a variety of philanthropical objects.

It was well known that in the Dutch Reformed Church the old leaven of Calvinistic doctrine was still working in the minds of a section of the people, especially in the villages and the farm-houses, and the watchword of the party of so-called enlightenment was to proceed cautiously and to preserve what they called a *juste milieu*. It was hoped that before very long, if they only took care not to go *te ver*, the sword of ecclesiastical controversy would be returned for ever to its scabbard, and in Holland's green and pleasant land, all would unite, in one Church, in working for the common weal.

"Blind mortals that we are," says Professor Oort, who retired not long ago from the Hebrew Chair at Leiden, looking back on the jubilant days of early Modernism—a movement that arose a generation later than the period we are dealing with—and thinking on how times had changed and he had changed with them. About the beginning of the second quarter of the century two movements took their rise in different parts of Holland, differing widely in character, but agreeing in this respect

that each went back in a way to earlier phases of the national religious life. One, which is always described by the foreign name, the *Réveil*—in which the leading spirits were chiefly jurists and men of letters—was at first a purely religious movement, but it soon passed into a question of Church and Doctrine, and ultimately deeply affected the development of theology all through the century. “From the day of Pentecost downwards,” Dr Rainy’s biographer has remarked, “revivals of religion, as a matter of history, have had far more influence on the theology of the Church than historians of dogma have recognised.” Without the movement known in Holland as the *Réveil* the whole course of religious thought in that country, and indeed of political thought and action, would have been different. The other movement was mainly, but not entirely, a theological movement, and had its centre in the University of Groningen. Although, as I have said, Holland is not easily moved by influences from without, the first movement, as the name indicates, had a foreign source. It had its origin in a religious awakening in

Switzerland, that Dutch writers trace to the evangelistic work of Robert Haldane in Geneva. In its original form it never spread widely in Holland. It was confined almost entirely to certain aristocratic circles in Amsterdam and the Hague. In a somewhat modified form, coloured to a certain extent by the ethical school of Chantepie de la Saussaye, and as represented by the most popular writer of the century, Nicolaas Beets, it has had a perceptible influence down to the present day. The political circumstances of the time had no doubt something to do with the rise of this movement. Latterly the French domination had weighed on the Dutch like a veritable nightmare. Their financial losses had been enormous, and the Dutch have had always a proper respect for the value of money. At the Restoration in 1813 there was a boundless feeling of joy and relief. But this was soon followed by a period of disillusionment, and the minds of the people were further depressed by the revolt of Belgium, after its short-lived union with Holland, and by a fruitless war.

Transplanted to Dutch soil, it was not long

before Swiss Evangelicalism assumed a very different shape from that in which it had arrived in the country, and this process of transformation into what became the Confessional and Anti-revolutionary party I have now to try to explain. The poet Bilderdijk, who has been eulogised by Southey in lines that are now forgotten, is always spoken of as the Father of the Dutch *Réveil*. As a student at Leiden he had been a friend of Van der Palm, but no two men could have been more unlike. Bilderdijk was always complaining. His first wife was a monster—so he described her—fortunately, the second was a ministering angel. His domestic life has been very fully discussed in Dutch literature. It does not concern us here, however, and is not an edifying story. Among the many things he complained about was that he was always misunderstood, and especially that he was misunderstood if he was not misunderstood. I think we may at least partly understand his position and his influence on political and ecclesiastical life if we suppose that he was labouring with certain ideas that

were coming to the birth with the new century—the ideas of organic unity and organic growth—ideas that became more clearly defined as time went on, and that have been ruling our thought down to the present time—ideas, I may add, that may possibly pass into the background before another century is out, when some new scientific conception, which has not yet emerged, may have become the dominant one and been turned on things in general. If, as Bilderdijk puts it, “a people is not a mere heap of souls upon a piece of land,” or again, if “In the Past lies To-day, and in what now is—what shall be,” we can understand at least his antipathy to revolutionary ideas, his veneration for historical institutions, political and ecclesiastical, and his attachment, with certain reservations, to the National Church and her creed—with no reservation whatever in respect to the characteristic doctrine of Predestination, which sees the spring of the religious life in an Almighty Power and not in individual volition. He had always a warm heart to what he called the Mother Church of Rome. Its main defect

in his eyes lay in its not accepting the doctrine of Irresistible Grace, while the main fault in his own Church was, as he supposed, that it looked on the Sacraments too much in the light of signs and seals. Whatever the prevalent view may have been at this time in the Dutch Church in regard to the Sacraments, the doctrine of the Reformed Church seems to be high enough to cover any views on Baptismal Regeneration and the Real Presence that a thinker and poet like Bilderdijk was likely to cherish. His doctrinal position had certain points of resemblance to that of his countryman Jansen. While Jansenism, I may here remark, which a distinguished French critic, M. Faguet, has described as "the last effort made by intellectual France to be seriously religious," is now represented in France, according to a recent editor of Pascal, by two hundred families in a single parish in Paris and by a small religious fraternity, in Holland it still counts about twenty-five congregations, and has recently shown some signs of renewed life. It has not been without a certain influence on Dutch religious thought.

The Groningen theologians, as we shall see in our next lecture, express their indebtedness to it in framing their theory of the Church. It had so much that was good in it and so much better than in much that followed it, that one may hope that it—or something like it—is not doomed to become extinct.

When Bilderdijk returned from exile in England and Germany he gave private lectures at Leiden in law and history, and gathered a group of disciples about him. Among them was the Jewish poet Da Costa, who, as he puts it, was brought by Bilderdijk to “the Christ whom his fathers had crucified,” and Groen van Prinsterer, a jurist, historian, and statesman. In Groen both the aspects of the *Réveil* which I have indicated, the foreign and the national, were combined, although, as might be expected, not very successfully. In doctrine he leaned more to the Swiss evangelical type than to that of Bilderdijk, but he may be said to have been the founder of the Confessional and Anti-revolutionary party, and during his lifetime he was its acknowledged leader. The more secular gatherings of the party were called by

the English name "meetings," and at these schemes were discussed for enforcing doctrinal purity in the Church and for securing Christian education in the schools; those of a devotional nature were distinguished as *réunions*. Literary art in Holland has always, I think, lagged behind the art of painting, except perhaps when Vondel and Rembrandt in the early seventeenth century stood supreme each in his own art; but the description by Alard Pierson, who had been brought up in this circle, of a meeting in a room in the "Amsterdam Arms," and of a *réunion* in an old Amsterdam mansion, is quite equal to a portrait group by Frans Hals or to an interior by Terborch. Groen was a scholarly man, and his favourite author was Plato. The opening question of the *Laws*, "Tell me, stranger, is God or man supposed to be the author of your laws?" is one that goes to the root of his thought. "My principles," he says in the *History of the Fatherland*, "can all be reduced to an unconditional subjection to God as He has revealed Himself in the Holy Scriptures. All history teaches us that for ruler and

people, apart from a common reverence for the Highest Law-Giver, there is nothing that can unite freedom and authority." In his *Oudere Tijdgenooten* Pierson describes how Groen looked on the Holland of his day through the eyes of Plato—the conservative Plato who professed to admire the unchanging wisdom of the Egyptians. The Platonic theocracy was the union of Church and State; the Greek city or state was the Dutch Reformed Church; the eternal ideas, the infallible Word of God, and the light of philosophy the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti*; the *Laws* was the Confession of Faith; the Platonic regulations, ecclesiastical discipline; while Plato's elders, training the young in measured dance and song, were the Dutch clergy instructing them in the Heidelberg Catechism.

There are two points in connection with Groen van Prinsterer's leadership which I propose to consider in what remains of this lecture. The first, although not in order of time, was the question of religious education in the elementary schools, and I notice it merely as an indication of the change in religious

thought that had taken place since the first quarter of the century. The second was the question of the relation of the Church to its doctrine and the significance of the subscription formula. The latter point will serve as an introduction to what I have to say in my next lecture about the contemporary Groningen school of theology—a school that Groen's party had directly in view all throughout the controversy. The theologians of Groningen admitted frankly that they deviated from traditional orthodoxy, but held that they did so legitimately from an ecclesiastical point of view, and—a matter of more importance in regard to theological teaching in a university—in the interests of theological science.

Van der Palm's system of education seems to have worked smoothly enough for about a generation. After the Belgian revolution in 1830, which Groen held would never have occurred if the Government had not thrust secular education on the people against their will, a strong desire sprang up both among Roman Catholics and in Groen's party for what they regarded as more distinctive Christian

teaching in the schools. When a member of Groen's party got a place in a Dutch ministry and was asked to draw up a new Education Bill, there were great hopes of gaining this end. The chief proposals in Van der Bruggen's Bill were that in all public schools Christian and social virtues were to be inculcated, while more distinctive religious teaching might be given by the Churches in the schools outside the usual school hours. At the same time, under certain conditions, private schools might be legalised and subsidised by the State. Groen vehemently opposed this scheme. In his mind Christian virtue and Christian doctrine were inseparable, and the Bill was dropped. This led to a split in the party. Beets the poet denounced Groen's action as criminal, and Chantepie de la Saussaye, who had wavered for a time on the Educational Question, drew aside more definitely from a party with which he had a certain sympathy, but, for reasons that will be seen when we come to trace in a later lecture the rise of the ethical school of theology, with which he had never been intimately connected. As I shall not have occasion to refer again to

the question of religious education in the Dutch schools, I shall notice here very briefly its later history. A good many years after the time of the Van der Bruggen Bill the political party founded by Groen came into office in coalition with the Roman Catholics under a statesman of Scottish descent, whose family has long held an honourable place in the civil and military history of Holland, and has given a distinguished educationist to this country in Lord Reay; and by an Act known as the Mackay Law, the public and the Christian schools were put on practically the same footing with regard to State support. At the present day these schools are to be seen side by side in almost every village in Holland. To the outsider this seems a deplorable state of things. What meaneth this waste of money and teaching power, to say nothing of other aspects of the subject that, in Dutch phrase, "spring into the eye"? Still, the Dutch are the best judges of what suits them best, and it is interesting to notice the opinion on the subject of one of their most enlightened philosophical writers. Professor van der Wijck, who succeeded Opzoomer in the

Chair of Philosophy at Utrecht, and has had considerable influence on philosophical and religious thought during the last quarter of the century, as we shall see in a later lecture, writes that the change that the mind of the people had undergone since the middle of the century had rendered a neutral system of education in the lower schools antiquated and impossible, or at least, in so far as it is still possible, pernicious. A people is growing up at present, he adds, without history, and a people without history is a dead people—ready to be absorbed by a more powerful neighbour. As I have some sympathy with Professor van der Wijck's views, I ought in fairness to quote the opinion of the eminent Arabic scholar, the late Professor Dozy of Leiden. He believed that unless Holland, both in its lower and its higher education, could succeed in shaking itself free from ecclesiastical and doctrinal influences, it was destined to sink into the intellectual condition of Mohammedan countries at the present day.

We must now turn back, as introductory to our examination of the Goningen School of theology, and also of the theology of

Scholten and Chantepie de la Saussaye—the subject of our third lecture—to the action of Groen's party on the question of the relation between Church and Doctrine. The Doctrine of the Dutch Reformed Church is contained in three documents, which are termed the Formularies of Unity. These are a *Confession of Faith* drawn up by Guido de Brès in 1561, which is modelled on the French Confession which was accepted by the Synod of Paris in 1559; a translation of the *Heidelberg Catechism*, drawn up in 1563, and the *Doctrinal Canons of Dort*, framed in 1619 by the Synod of Dort with a view to settle the Remonstrant or Arminian Controversy. The doctrine is, of course, essentially the same as that contained in all the Confessions of the Reformed Church, the *Westminster* among the rest, with certain points of difference which throw a certain light on the development of Reformed theology.

Dutch writers are fond of describing their formularies as beautiful, and the epithet sometimes at least is not inappropriate. The chapter on Providence, for example, is an exceedingly beautiful one. "We believe that

the same good God, after He had created all things, has not dismissed them or given them up to chance or fortune, but governs them and rules them according to His holy will; so that nothing happens in this world without His ordinance; nevertheless God is neither the author nor is He guilty of any sin that is committed. . . . This doctrine affords us unspeakable consolation, since we are taught by it that nothing can befall us by chance, but by the disposition of our most bountiful Heavenly Father, who watches over us with a Fatherly care, keeping all creatures in such wise under His care that not a hair of our head (for they are all numbered) and not a little sparrow can fall to the ground without our Father, in whom we do entirely trust . . . And thus we reject that damnable error of the Epicureans, who say that God never troubles Himself about anything, but allows everything to fall out by chance." It is true that in the doctrinal canons of Dort the Dutch possess in a concentrated form the deductions that were drawn by the Synod from Calvin's doctrine of predestination, and that have passed into the

texture of the Westminster Confession. There may, however, be a certain advantage in having a thing that, as the Westminster Confession puts it, "is to be handled with special prudence and care," tied up, as it were, in a separate parcel and marked dangerous, as we do with gunpowder and poison. The Dort decrees never seem to have been regarded as having quite the same authority in Holland as the Confession and the Catechism. They did not fully satisfy the leading Dutch theologians of the time, who, including the president of the Synod, were Supralapsarians. In the life of Hendrik de Cock, who became a zealot for sound doctrine and was the leader of a secession that took place in 1835, it is stated—it illustrates the attitude of the Church to its doctrine about the time of the rise of the Gronigen School—that he was about ten years a clergyman before he had even seen the Dort Canons, a copy of which he found by chance in the house of one of his parishioners, and was deeply impressed by it. On hearing of this, Hofstede de Groot, the founder of the Groningen School, who had been a University friend of

De Cock's and his predecessor in this parish, wrote to him: "De Cock! De Cock! how deeply, deeply hast thou fallen, and how dark are the ways of Providence: to think that such a doctrine should be preached to a congregation that once was mine!" Another obvious point in which the two Confessions differ is the presence in the Westminster and the absence from the Dutch of the covenant idea, an idea which entered deeply into old Scottish theology and acted forcibly on Scottish history. There are traces of it in the Dutch liturgy, which is an abridgment of that of Johannes à Lasco, who was a friend of Ballinger. Covenant theology seems to have been making considerable way in Holland after the predestination question had been settled. There was much intercourse in the seventeenth century, commercial as well as intellectual, between Scotland and Holland. I once heard a minister from Fife at an ecclesiastical gathering in Amsterdam claiming an interest in Holland on the ground that it had made a big hole in his parish, the stones which were used in building the Stadhuis, which is now the Royal Palace,

having been quarried there in Covenanting times. In the famous Glasgow Assembly of 1638, the first Professor of Divinity in this University favoured the members with a summary of Covenant theology imported from Holland, which seems to have made a deep impression on them, the Moderator thanking God that a threatening heresy had now been nipped in the bud. In Holland the idea was never quite so popular as in Scotland. It was associated there with what was regarded as the latitudinarian system of Cocceius.

The Heidelberg Catechism, the third Formulary of Unity, is an exposition of the Apostles' Creed, the doctrine of the Sacraments, the Ten Commandments, and the Lord's Prayer; and if the object of a catechism, as Dr Kuyper puts it, is to make our children pious Christians and not little theologians, its compilers have certainly kept this end in view. Its doctrine agrees in every respect with that of the Confession, which had a French source; but it is marked by a distinctly milder tone than that of most summaries of Reformed doctrine,

which may be due to the fact that its chief author had been a pupil of Melanchthon. It was in use for a time in Scotland after the Reformation. It has always been a custom in Holland to make it the subject of a discourse on Sundays at the afternoon service, and the custom is probably more widely observed at the present day than was the case some years ago.

The earliest subscription formula binding the teachers of the Church to the Formularies of Unity which I have briefly described, or rather, as conceived by Groen's party, to the Church as an institution doctrinally based upon the Formularies of Unity—"they are not," Groen said, "a rule of faith, but of preaching and teaching in church and school"; and Dr Kuyper says that "they have exclusively an ecclesiastical authority, and not the least authority over the conscience of the individual, which belongs to God's Word alone"—was that which was adopted by the Synod of Dort. It required the candidate for the ministry to accept the formularies as, in all respects, in agreement with the Word of God. When the

Church was reorganised in 1816, a new formula was framed, which runs as follows:—"We accept in good faith and heartily believe the doctrine, which, in agreement with the Word of God, is contained in the Formularies of Unity of the Dutch Reformed Church." The change in phraseology may seem slight, but in course of time it led to a ferment in the Church, which lasted for many years. When Groen's party, in opposition to the Groningen School, set itself to the task of enforcing what it regarded as sound doctrine, a question arose as to the interpretation of the formula, and the Church was divided into two parties, known as that of the *Quia* and that of the *Quatenus*. Did the words in the formula—"the doctrine in agreement with the Word of God"—mean "the doctrine because it agreed with the Word of God," or "the doctrine in so far as it agreed with the Word of God"? The former party held that they were in the right, otherwise, as Groen put it, the formula would be an explanation that explained nothing, and a promise that promised nothing. The latter held that they must be right, otherwise the new formula

would be equivalent to the old, while it was evident that it was meant to have a more liberal signification. The former party retorted that the theory of the latter imputed disingenuousness to the framers of the formula, and cast a slur on their memory. One of these veterans, however, Donker Curtius, who was still alive and could "mind the biggin o't"—very much alive as De Cock and his dissentient followers found to their cost—stoutly maintained the *Quatenus* reading. Heringa of Utrecht, a man of great weight in the counsels of the Church, tried to steer a middle course. Exegetically he felt bound to adopt the *Quia* reading, but with the proviso that it was to be understood only of the substance of the doctrine. His usual sound judgment, however, failed him when he took the matter in hand himself, and his proposal, in 1835, to adopt a formula which should safeguard the "characteristic doctrine" of the formularies was unanimously rejected by the Synod. Whether Professor Troeltzsch is exactly right in describing predestination, in a recent study of Calvinism, as "its famous central dogma," viewed as a doctrinal system,

may be questioned, but it is at least a prominent characteristic dogma, and even Groen's party at that time did not wish it to be put in the forefront. The Synod decided to defer the matter "until better times when they should have more light"; till there stood up a priest with Urim and Thummim. This waiting attitude did not satisfy the Church. Something had to be done to allay the storm, and accordingly a formula was drawn up and adopted in 1841. In this formula the candidate is required to give his adherence to the doctrine, which constitutes in its nature and spirit the essence and substance of the formularies. Scholten interpreted this as meaning the fundamental principles of Reformed theology, and accepting it as a challenge on the part of the Church to her theologians to expound them, for a Church cannot be supposed to seek to hide her doctrinal light under a bushel, he wrote his work on the doctrine of the Reformed Church. Some account of the nature and spirit of this work will form the substance of the third lecture of this series, along with a notice of the theological views of his equally able con-

temporary and antagonist, Chantepie de la Saussaye.

Having perhaps to some extent cleared the ground in the preliminary sketch I have given in the present lecture, I shall look in my next at the leading ideas of the Groningen theological school, and at the influence of the empirical philosophy of Opzoomer on Dutch theology. A review of the rise and fall of Modernism in Holland, of the various ethical schools of theology, and of the position of Dr Kuyper and his school, in the two remaining lectures of the course, will bring our long journey to a welcome end.

THE GRONINGEN SCHOOL AND THE
EMPIRICAL SCHOOL

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IN my opening lecture, after giving a short account of religious thought in Holland during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, I passed on to notice the religious movement known as the *Réveil*, which arose about the beginning of the second quarter of the century. The men of the *Réveil* were not at first much interested in theology as such, nor specially qualified to deal with it. But they were soon forced, by the rise about the same time of the avowedly heterodox school of Groningen, to take up a strong stand, as we have seen, for what they held to be sound doctrine, and the result of this importation of Swiss, or ultimately English or Scottish evangelicalism into Holland, was the revival of a Calvinism that was deeply rooted in the minds of the people.

In the rise of the Groningen school two

influences may also be traced, one of which likewise goes back to an earlier phase of the religious life of Holland, originating about a century before the birth of the great French theologian who found a home and an intellectual throne in Geneva. In the neighbourhood of Brussels there is a green and pleasant little valley on the eastern edge of the Bois de Soignies—peaceful still, except when invaded by the motor-car—where the mystic Ruysbroek retired, with a small company of disciples, in his sixtieth year, to write his books, and where he died, twenty-eight years afterwards, in 1381. A few years before his death the Dutchman, Gerard Groote, with some of his friends, joined Ruysbroek in his retreat at Groenendaal, and imbibed his opinions. With Gerard Groote—the founder of the Order of the Brothers of the Common Life—the mystical school of Ruysbroek was transported to the extreme north of Holland. I shall mention only two other names in connection with this spiritual succession, that of Thomas à Kempis or Thomas Hamerken, the author of the “*Imitatio Christi*”—for that Hamerken was the author is

a point, I think, that can now be regarded as finally settled—and Wessel Gausfoort, who was born at Groningen, and whose name is linked with that of Luther. To these we must add the illustrious name of Erasmus, who was regarded by the Groningen theologians as among their spiritual progenitors. There was not much of the mystic in the clear-eyed and mundane Erasmus, and he was only a boy of thirteen when he left the school of the Brothers of the Common Life at Deventer. He was old enough, however, to carry away with him something of the spirit of the school, which comes out in the wish, expressed in later life, that “the dove of Christ, and not the owl of Minerva, would fly to us,” and also, possibly, in the method he advocated of presenting Christian truth: “Let Christ remain where He is, the centre, with certain circles about Him.”

The still, small voice of Dutch mysticism died away in the storm of the Reformation period. Still Hamerken's book was never lost sight of. It was a favourite book with the Reformed schoolman Voetius in the seventeenth

century. To the student of Calvin, however, who knows that in his view of the *unio mystica*, as expressed especially in his doctrine of the Lord's Supper, there are points of close connection between the *Imitatio* and the *Institutio*, that will not seem strange.

The second influence that went to form the modern Groningen school was the study of Plato—not that side of the many-sided Plato that appealed to the Conservative statesman Groen van Prinsterer, but as he was represented in the writings, and more especially in the mode of teaching, of Professor van Heusde of Utrecht. Before looking at this latter influence I shall notice a principle which was always prominent in the Groningen School, and which they derived from the old mystical school of North Holland. They expressed it in alliterative Dutch in such phrases as “*Niet de leer, maar het leven*,” not the doctrine but the life; “*Niet de leer, maar de Heer*,” not the doctrine but the Lord. “What will it avail thee,” we read in the *Imitatio*, “to dispute profoundly of the Trinity, if thou be void of humility and art thereby displeasing to the Trinity? . . .

I had rather feel compunction than understand the definition thereof. . . . And what have we to do with genus and species, the dry notions of logicians?" And at the close, "It is a blessed simplicity when a man leaves the difficult ways of questions and disputing and goes on forward in the plain and firm path of God's commandments." In common with their opponents at Amsterdam and the Hague, whom Alard Pierson likens to the early Franciscans as representing a reaction of orthodox believers against orthodoxy, the Groningen divines began by protesting against what they regarded as over-intellectualism in religion. But like early Christianity and like the Reformers, both parties in Holland found themselves forced to dogmatise—to define their position—to give some intelligible explanation of the special kind of religious life to which they attached importance. One of the Groningen theologians—Professor Pareau—wrote a little book of fables to enforce the principle that life and not doctrine is the main thing in religion. One of these runs as follows:—"Two travellers rose at sunrise to make a journey together. Before setting out

they began to dispute with one another as to whether the sun was incandescent only at its surface, or whether the incandescence went right through to its centre. They discussed the question hotly until the sun had set, and so the day was lost." The poet Da Costa, who was a leader among the *Réveil* men, was asserting about the same time—in view of the Tübingen critical school, which was beginning to be heard of with some alarm in Holland—that the true way to enjoy the flavour of an apple was to bite it and not to dissect it. Both Da Costa and Pareau were seeking to express the truth that life is more than doctrine, but in a way that confuses the question of the relation between life and doctrine. While a botanist can enjoy apple-eating as well as other people, and an astronomer can use and enjoy the sunlight, their special function with regard to suns and apples is to study them scientifically. And the theologian is precisely in the same case. The fact that his subject of study is an aspect of the spiritual life, involving emotions and volitions as well as ideas, and that he must be able to enter

sympathetically into all the elements of the religious life, which he cannot do without experiencing them in his own spiritual life—this fact does not alter the case. What he has to give us is theory or doctrine and nothing else. In theology or the science of religion, emotion and volition must take upon them the form of thought. Grey theory is not green life, but if we are to theorise at all, we must “doff the green and don the grey.” Religion can easily be too intellectual; theology cannot be too much so. And this holds good, I think, even if we recognise that our theories or doctrines fall unspeakably short of the Reality that we try to explain to ourselves by means of them. This is also the case in every science. All things go out into mystery. The fundamental conceptions underlying chemistry and astronomy at the present day cannot be said to be more ultimate or stable than the doctrines by means of which the Christian Church has endeavoured to explain the meaning of her own life. These remarks, however, carry us beyond the stage at which we have arrived in tracing the development of religious thought

in Holland, and touch on questions that will have to be considered in connection with the writings of later theologians. What we have to notice at present are the influences that combined at the time to form the theology of the school we are now dealing with. One, as I have just pointed out, was a return to an earlier phase of religious thought. The other great influence was the teaching of Professor van Heusde. Dutch writers speak of Van Heusde as one of the most remarkable men that ever lived in Holland. A German writer of the time called him *Præceptor Hollandiæ*. Early in the century—in 1804—he was appointed Professor of Greek and History in the University of Utrecht. A born teacher, he was specially attracted to Plato. Whatever changes may be traced in the development of Platonic thought, there is one thing that never changed in Plato—his absorbing interest in education. In his lectures Van Heusde adopted to some extent the form of dialogue, and he is said to have had a miraculous power of drawing out whatever was in the mind of a pupil, provided, my Dutch authority adds, there was

anything in it at all. He had many enthusiastic disciples, who were known as Heusdiaans, and among them were three—Van Oordt, Pareau, the fabulist, and Muurling, who became professors, within a year or two of each other, in the theological faculty of Groningen. Hofstede de Groot, who became the head of the school, was not a pupil of Van Heusde, but while he was a student at Groningen a MS. copy, he tells us, of Van Heusde's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* fell into his hands, and the reading of it was a turning-point in his life. Van Heusde spoke very little about Christianity. His special influence on the development of the school will be seen when we go on to consider its leading ideas.

Before doing so, however, I must mention a third influence that combined with the two I have referred to in forming the Groningen School. Doctrinal theology, as we have seen, had fallen into disrepute during the first quarter of the century. Mutual tolerance, ecclesiastical comprehensiveness, Christian brotherhood were the watchwords of the day—admirable and desirable things in the eyes of the young

theologians of Groningen; but they felt that something more definite than these high-sounding and somewhat hollow phrases was needed. And the want was felt by others as well as by them. Thoughtful people in Holland began to see that theology was fast becoming a kind of quagmire, and that on such swampy ground—as Christiaan Sepp remarks—the plant of true tolerance can never grow. This may explain the fact that although the Groningen theologians deviated widely from traditional orthodoxy, they met with a considerable amount of sympathy among the more educated classes, and it is universally admitted that they did much to quicken the religious life of the country. One thing that contributed to this—the sympathy the Groningen theologians met with—was that they appealed to what I described in my last lecture as one of the most characteristic features in the Dutch—their feeling of nationality. They put forward their views as genuinely Dutch. Calvinism they tried to represent as a foreign importation imposed on them in 1619 by the sword of Maurice. What they sought to put

in its place, they held, was a theology that would reflect the simple, definite, practical, hearty spirit of their countrymen Wessel and Erasmus. A sympathetic critic of the time, who did not share their theological opinions, remarks—with an eye on the contemporaneous *Réveil* movement—that “it is not to the credit of our national Church that it should go for its spiritual milk and meat to Scotsmen and Englishmen, the French and the Swiss. Foreign books and teachers give foreign twists to our piety. Even in the kingdom of God nationality cannot be disregarded with impunity. And although there is no distinction before God between Jew and Gentile, let every one remain as he is called : he who is called as a Dutchman, a Dutchman let him remain.” I am not going to criticise the Dutch in these lectures ; for the most part I shall let them criticise themselves ; but one is tempted to remark that if this principle were carried out a little further it would end in rejecting Christianity altogether, which in its origin, historically viewed, was a purely Israelitish influence. Another point in connection with

the rise of this school is suggested by what struck me as one of the most characteristic words in Dutch literature, the word *Geestverwanten*, which may be translated as spiritual allies—people of the same mental disposition. More than most people the Dutch seem to feel the need of thinking in a group. The late Professor Albert Réville, of the College of France, who began his career as a clergyman in the Dutch Church, stated in an article in the *Revue des deux Mondes* in 1860, that what struck him most about the Dutch character was an astonishing mixture of decision and timidity. What I have just referred to may not be unconnected with this characteristic. It comes out very clearly in the rise of the Groningen school, and to illustrate this and to bring us at last to some of the leading ideas of the school, I shall quote the account of an incident in the somewhat naïve form in which Hofstede de Groot narrates it. “On a certain Friday evening in the winter of 1833-34, we three professors, Van Oordt, Pareau, and myself, were sitting together and talking over our lectures, a subject about which we were often

at a loss and about which we used to consult one another. 'Yesterday it struck me with absolute clearness,' said one, 'that history is properly the chief thing in Christianity, and that everything rests on what God has done and still does in and by Jesus Christ.' 'You mean,' said the second, 'everything goes back to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ—thus St Paul expresses it. Fourteen days ago I saw that we must begin our theology with that.' Said the third, 'For three or four days I could not get on with my lectures at all till it flashed upon me like a light, "Not a doctrine of Paul or of Jesus is what we have to preach, but the Evangel, that is the glad tidings of a history of what God reveals and presents to us in His Son."' In such wise, more or less, we conversed. Who the first, the second, or the last speaker was I no longer remember, but only indeed this, that we now went deeper into a thought that for long had not been strange to us, but which at last and at the same time became quite clear to each of us, although on further discussion it appeared that it had come to one of us more by the way of

exegesis, to another by that of history, and to the third by that of philosophy." This central thought they expounded and expanded in a series of Latin compendia, some of them the result of collaboration—a thing unique, De Groot boasts, in a theological faculty—and in a more popular form in their journal, *Waarheid en Liefde*, which was begun in 1837.

In explaining briefly the leading ideas of this school I shall confine myself to three main doctrines—their doctrines concerning Christ, the Church, and salvation. A point on which they placed the utmost importance was the historical aspect of Christianity. In their encyclopædia, not of theology, but, as they put it, of the Christian theologian, they begin with Jesus Christ "as He lived on earth 1800 years ago," and then pass on to the Church, in which He still lives and acts upon earth; afterwards taking up the different sciences which the Christian theologian requires in order to explain these facts or *daadzaaken*—a word which, like the corresponding German word, conveys more than our word facts, and is much used by the Groningen theologians. In their

Dogmatics they begin with the doctrine concerning Christ. In Him, in His Person, words, and works, we see and hear what God is and what man is and can be. The definition of the Person of Christ must be based upon His historical appearance as recorded in the Gospels, and, in a secondary sense, upon the New Testament as a whole, not as infallible, but as inerrant, having been written, as they took for granted, by those who had come under the direct influence of the historical Jesus Christ. On this ground they held that we must go back to what seemed to them to be the prevalent view in the early Church before the Council of Nice in 325 and the condemnation of Apollinaris in 381. What they objected to chiefly in the orthodox doctrine was the ascription of two natures to Christ, but differing from Apollinaris, they held that the one nature of Christ is at once Divine and human, and this was connected with their view that man as a spiritual being is of the same nature as God. They held further that this Divine-human Person was pre-existent but not eternally existent; that He was born

in this world miraculously; and they saw in Him the image and reflection of the one Supreme God and the type of perfect humanity. The end of Christ's appearance on earth was to reveal God, and to educate men in the likeness of God; and this end is continued in the Church which He founded. Their doctrine concerning the Church, therefore, is connected with and follows immediately in their dogmatics upon that concerning Christ. The oldest Confession of the Dutch Reformed Church, they point out—that of 1551—starts from the idea of the Church, keeps close to it all along, and ends with it. "To understand the doctrine of the true Church," it begins, "the word Church must first be explained." On this point, they held, both Calvin and Luther had erred. "With the victory of the particularism of Calvinism at the Synod of Dort," so Hofstede de Groot puts it, "insight into the meaning of the Church began to disappear." And again, "Luther did not see that separate Christians, each one for himself, can never realise the end of God in the appearance of Jesus Christ; that this can

only be realised in the Communion of Saints, a doctrine which," he adds, referring to certain passages in Luther's writings, which I have had no opportunity of consulting, "Luther did not understand." Some light may be thrown on their theory of the Church if we turn for a moment to their *Theologia Naturalis*, which was written by De Groot. The words I shall quote may now seem commonplace enough, but they must have given a fresh view of things at the time when they were written. "Much confusion has arisen in philosophy from not placing sufficiently in the foreground the fact that man is a social being, and can only become man in a society. Man, as a solitary being upon a lonely island, is a creature of the imagination, not an actuality. Real men are born of parents, who care for them. They come into a small circle, gradually becoming wider, of brothers and sisters, relations, neighbours, fellow-men, and, unless he lived in this constantly widening human society, the child would not become a man. In his mother's womb he lives the life of a plant, newly born that of an animal,

and an animal he would remain were he not taken up into human society and there gradually formed into a man. The consciousness of the spiritual world, of which the child must become a member, would remain dormant in him if it were not awakened by seeing and hearing other men in whom this consciousness has become awake. It would sleep like the spark in the flint, which has not been struck by iron; like the flame in the oil, which has not been set alight by another flame. In man, viewed apart from society, we can look only for a capacity for the spiritual life. To find the beginning of the spiritual life we must thus go outside the individual, and seek for it in the spiritual society in which he lives." To return to their dogmatics: in framing their doctrine *De Ecclesia*, the Groningen theologians acknowledged their indebtedness to the followers of their countryman Jansen, an ecclesiastical community which, De Groot remarks, do not receive the attention they deserve. The difference between them and the Reformers, he adds, is that while the latter preferred to attach

the New Covenant to the Old, the former preferred to attach it to the history and tradition of the Church. "We," he says, "wish to combine both tendencies—to regard the Old Covenant as a preparation, and Church history as a continuation of that which the New Covenant presents as the chief source and criterion of Christian truth." As is the tendency, however, of all Christocentric systems of theology, the Groningen School appears to have greatly underestimated the importance of the religious life of ancient Israel, and the literature which grew out of it, viewed as a preparation for Christianity, as well as the intrinsic value of the Old Testament as an expression of religious faith, and this may have been due, in their case, to a doctrine regarding Christ which cuts Him off, as to His human nature, from the race from which He sprang.

The Soteriology of the Groningen School is closely connected with its doctrine regarding the Church. It is to be found most fully set forth in the *Compendium Theologiæ Christianæ Moralis*, the work of Pareau. Christ's end in coming to the earth was to

found a community in which men are to be formed and trained and educated in heart and will and understanding. Compared with the Republic of Plato, the Church is a reality and not an ideal, and it exists for the purpose of developing in man "the Divine-human nature of Jesus Christ." It is in their ethics and practical theology that the Groningen divines are seen perhaps at their best, and it is here that what they regarded as the main formative influences in the development of the school—the old mystical school of North Holland and the teaching of Van Heusde—are most evident. But I cannot give them more space. I may say, however, before leaving this school, that its chief merit seems to me that all its members express their views with admirable clearness, and that they try at least to put some life into what, in their time, had become the dry bones of theology. I do not propose to criticise in detail any of the movements of religious thought in Holland with which I shall have to deal. What I shall try to do is to show how religious thought in the course of its development criticises itself. And I shall here indicate

briefly, as will be seen more fully hereafter, the main lines of criticism to which the views of the Groningen theologians were subjected. The first, although not perhaps in order of time, was from the side of New Testament criticism. It was in 1816 that this subject first became a special branch of study in the Dutch universities. The year after the conversation between the three Groningen professors, when their views became crystallised, in 1835, Strauss's *Leben Jesu* and Baur's work on the Pastoral Epistles appeared. These and other works of the Tübingen School were known to all Dutch scholars, but it was long before they were taken seriously. They were regarded pretty much in the same light as the theories of Loman and Van Manen in Holland at the present day. New Testament criticism was ably represented in other ways by Van Hengel at Leiden, and, somewhat later, by Doedes at Utrecht. Van Hengel is famed for his exact scholarship. Some of his countrymen were of opinion that he carried the virtue of ἀκριβεία too far. He used to ponder for days on the significance of a single particle in a

text, but he found time to produce substantial work which had a European reputation. Doedes devoted himself chiefly to textual criticism. He gave a much more considerable place to the art of conjectural emendation than English scholars believe to be necessary, and in this respect has influenced later Dutch scholarship. I do not know if his work is known among scholars outside Holland, but from the little I know about it I have an impression that they would find it interesting. He is still remembered with much regard by his former students. To Doedes the great desideratum in theology was a pure text of the New Testament. "Your great-grandson," a friendly critic assured him, "will be looking for a pure text, and will be no nearer finding one than we are." With regard to historical criticism, even as late as 1856, when Scholten's "Introduction to the New Testament" appeared, we find him, as well as Albert Réville, who was then minister of the French church at Rotterdam, working on conservative lines. From this side, therefore, for a period of about twenty years, the Groningen

theologians were left comparatively undisturbed. Soon after the date I have mentioned a rapid change took place in their views on this subject among Dutch scholars. The dam that had long resisted the waves that beat against it was at last pierced, and the country was soon flooded. A very able writer, Basken Huet, a clergyman in the French church at Leiden, thought fit to popularise Tübingen views in a widely read book which was published in 1858. The Groningen theologians felt that thus the foundation of their system, "the historical appearance of Jesus Christ, according to the knowledge," as they put it in the *Encyclopædia*, "which every one possesses of Him," was being undermined, and they were now as ready to give as short shrift to the critics as the men of the *Réveil* in earlier days had wished to give to themselves.

The second main line of criticism, as it is seen in the course of the development of religious thought, was from the side of philosophy, which began to come into closer contact with theology. It assumed two forms, according to the philosophy accepted—whether it

was an empirical or idealistic view of the world. For the Groningen conception of the Person of Christ neither system could find a place. Accepting an idealistic view of the world, theologians like Scholten and Chantepie de la Saussaye, in endeavouring in their theology to explain or to give an intellectual form to the faith and life of the Christian Church, were led back to the doctrines regarding God and Christ as they had been defined in the early Church and taken over by Reformed theology, and to the soteriology of Reformed theology, while they attempted to adapt these to the intellectual conditions of the time. Others, accepting an empirical and anti-supernatural view of the world, as it was presented in the philosophy of Opzoomer, saw in Jesus Christ—at least in what their philosophical principle and historical criticism left of Him—a mere man among men.

When Dutch writers, engaged in their favourite task of describing their national characteristics, say that the Dutch mind is not philosophical, we need not ascribe this to excessive modesty on their part, although, as it happens, undue modesty is a touch that is sometimes

added to the picture. "Hast any philosophy in thee, shepherd?" asks one of Shakspeare's philosophers. A Dutchman—I gather from their own words—would sympathise with the reply: "No more, but I know the more one sickens the worse at ease he is, and that he that wants money, means, and content is without three good friends." Professor Land, a high authority on the subject of philosophy in Holland, remarks that it has found little acceptance in that country. "It was regarded as unfruitful, cold as ice, and, above all, neological—three serious objections among a people who are convinced that honest gains, the domestic hearth, and fixed principles are the highest interests in life." During the period we have been dealing with—that is, up to 1846, when Opzoomer was appointed Professor of Philosophy at Utrecht—Kant had a certain number of adherents in Holland, and Hegel was not without his partisans; but modern philosophy cannot be said to have materially affected the development of religious thought. Van Heusde's influence on Groningen theology we have just noticed, but his contemporary, Nieuwenhuis,

—the Professor of Philosophy at Leiden—says of Van Heusde that, “unspeakably great as he was in literature and history, he was not up to the mark—*op de hoogte*—in the philosophy of the nineteenth century. On the death of Nieuwenhuis, the veteran theologian Clarisse, who was not without a philosophical vein, suggested that the University should look abroad for a successor. Van Heusde’s own opinion about philosophy was “that it should aim at simplicity, be characterised by good sound understanding, and along with this good principles, which, above all, must not conflict with our religious doctrine.” This last condition was certainly not fulfilled when philosophy, with the advent of Opzoomer, began really to influence religious thought. Opzoomer studied law at Leiden, but even in his student days he was interested in theological questions. He was an enthusiastic young man, and is said to have been drawn to the study of theology by a wish to convert an admired teacher who was supposed to have diverged from the faith of the Church. He began to write on the subject while he was still a student, and before

very long found that he had trodden on the toes of every theologian of any note in Holland, and the young jurist had soon quite a variety of theological pleas on his hands. Only one of these controversies I shall notice; it is connected with his own intellectual development, and had an influence on that of Scholten. In philosophy Opzoomer began as a Krausian. The philosophy of Krause seems to have reached Holland by way of Belgium. In the University of Brussels it has had a certain vogue since the time of Ahrens, whom Dr Hastie describes as the ablest and best known of Krause's students. It was introduced into Leiden by Nieuwenhuis, who translated some of Krause's works, and was eagerly adopted by the enthusiastic young Opzoomer. In his book on *Religion*, which appeared twenty years later than the time we have now reached, he writes of this earlier period of his life with something of the fervour of a knight of King Arthur's court who had caught a fleeting vision of the Holy Grail. "I still remember the feeling of joy that thrilled in my heart when I possessed the assurance that I had the great whole of the

world under the power of my reason, when, in the beginning of my career, under the influence of Krause, I dreamed with him his beautiful dream." Even those among Dr Hastie's friends who could never share with him his enthusiasm for Krause, must feel some interest in a philosopher whom he was the first to introduce directly to English readers by his translation of the "Ideal of Humanity," with its most touching and most beautiful prefatory note. The discussion between Scholten and Opzoomer, arising out of the writings of the latter, while still under the influence of Krause, it is not necessary to notice in detail. Scholten was a born polemic—cold and cutting as steel, one writer says; and Opzoomer was not one who was 'soon dashed.' The controversy was a violent one, "overstepping the bounds," as Sepp says, "not only of what was due to Christian feeling but to common decency." "What God," he adds,—and the remark may be applied to ecclesiastical and literary controversies nearer home,—“what God, as we hope, has buried, we will not dig up again.” The general outcome of it, however, may be

given. On Scholten it seems to have had an educative influence—clearing up his ideas on the question of the relation between Reason and Revelation. In 1847 he wrote his *De Pugna theologiam inter atque philosophiam recto utriusque studio tollenda*—a sound principle, not perhaps very easily carried out. Opzoomer in 1846, at the age of twenty-five, was appointed Professor of Philosophy in the University of Utrecht. Shortly afterwards he discarded Krause, whose vogue in Holland was limited and short-lived, and developed a system of empirical philosophy, which had a wide influence on the religious thought of the country.

“For a person in a given situation to accomplish anything,” says a German philosopher who has had considerable influence on the religious thought of our own country, “he must stick to one definite point.” As my definite point is the religious thought of Holland and not its philosophy—and in the Dutch mind at least the two things are not to be confounded—I shall touch on Opzoomer’s philosophy only as it directly influenced religious thought. Opzoomer was exceedingly popular

as a teacher. He was a man of fascinating character, great eloquence, and high ideals. One of his pupils—Professor van der Wijck, who succeeded him in the Chair of Philosophy at Utrecht—in a sketch of his life, quotes the saying, as applying to him, “To Philip I owe my life, to Aristotle that which gives life its value.” His early interest in theology never deserted him. Although his philosophical principles compelled him, as he thought, to discard miracles and the doctrinal formulas of the Church, his personal faith in what he came to regard as the essence of Christianity remained undisturbed and assumed indeed a very definite form—an even more dogmatic form, I think we may say, than Christian theology gives it, for this would not describe the world of actual experience as “a perfectly harmonious work of art.” Opzoomer’s philosophical standpoint was that of a Naturalism that sees in the world of experiences, outer and inner, merely the working of the law of cause and effect. All our knowledge is confined to this. “Our religion,” he says, “must be reconciled with the science of our time. The

doctrines that we preach must contain no propositions regarding the world and man which are condemned by science—no assertions regarding God's operation in nature and in history that are falsified by what we see every moment taking place in nature and in history." "There are times," he says elsewhere, "when even the most cultured men have a lively feeling that there may be some higher law than this—that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in this philosophy." But with the development of science on the lines he had laid down, he thinks that this feeling will be explained and dispelled. Alongside his scientific view of the world Opzoomer puts a totally different one. In our inner experience religious faith exists in the form of feeling, which, somehow in his mind, takes a distinctly intellectual shape and content—a belief in the perfect wisdom and love of God. Criticising one of his disciples, Alard Pierson, whom he accuses of drifting into mysticism, he says that "a religion without dogmas is as much an absurdity as an object without qualities. Religion is not a nothing but a something (*Geen niets maar een*

iets), and what is actually something is something entirely determined, is just that and nothing else, nothing more and nothing less. If a feeling exists, then it is a special, definite feeling, and if it has its ground in a belief, it is a special, definite belief. When I speak of wisdom and love I know what the words signify, for I find them, in a limited measure, in myself and my fellow-man. Fine phrases (*schoone klanken*),” he tells his friend, “which contain no definite thought, and perhaps absurdity and contradiction, are here of no use,” and he ends by referring him to the riper wisdom of life to be found in a passage in Thackeray’s “Pendennis.” Opzoomer, like all critics, is quick to behold the mote that is in his brother’s eye, but considers not the beam that is in his own eye. I shall not attempt to criticise him, but I shall try to show how he was criticised by the movement of religious thought in his own country. And from this point of view I think we may trace, as in the case of the Groningen School, two main lines of criticism, which I shall briefly indicate before concluding. In the first place, it

came to be seen, first of all by Alard Pierson—who cut himself adrift from the Church in 1865, the year after the passage I have just quoted was written—and then more clearly in the history of the Modernist school of theology, which will be the subject of my fourth lecture, that Opzoomer's philosophical standpoint was inconsistent with the religious view of the world which he sought to combine with it, and that the religious thought of the country, in rejecting anti-supernaturalism, which was the watchword of that school, was obeying, at least, a true instinct. In the second place, it came to be seen that his scientific view of life and of the world could not explain the facts of the religious life. The ethical aspect of Scholten's theology, as well as the theology, of Chantepie de la Saussaye as a whole, turned the minds of thinkers in Holland to a keen study of ethical problems, and the result of this was that some of them—among them Professor van der Wijck, who had been for long a devoted adherent of Opzoomer—came to the conclusion that the teleological conception was necessary to explain the facts of the

moral and religious life, and was not, therefore, a mere matter of faith, as it was to Opzoomer, but had a right to be regarded as a scientific principle.

I may be permitted—in concluding one of a course of Hastie Lectures on the subject of Dutch thought—to mention that the last time I met Dr Hastie, our talk turned on the conception I have just referred to in connection with a famous picture of Holland's greatest painter—the picture at the Hague known as the “Lesson in Anatomy.” It is a remarkable fact that, until Dr Hastie wrote an exceedingly interesting article on the subject in the *Contemporary Review* in 1891, not one of the numerous writers on Rembrandt seems to have penetrated into what he describes as “the inmost motive and meaning of the great picture.” “We cannot doubt,” he says, “that the young artist had special purpose and meaning in painting the particular fact in the structure of the human organism upon which is thrown the revealing light that guides us to the central interest of the ‘Lesson in Anatomy.’ . . . The professor

of anatomy is pointedly holding up the body of the *Flexor sublimis* with his forceps, in a moment of pause after the lecture, that the students may clearly see and realise its situation and connections. The perforations or slits in its tendons, with the perforating tendons of the *Flexor profundus* passing through them, and their insertions, are all drawn with as minute accuracy as the scientific illustrations of them in our own latest text-books of anatomy." The special point of interest, as he previously explains, is the representation of the device by which the lower tendon in the hand is carried beyond the upper one, and it is this, he held, that gives unity and life to the great picture in which "Science, Theology, and Art meet and are harmonised in absolute unity." Dr Hastie's article, buried in an old magazine, is perhaps not widely known, and I have seen no reference to his interesting interpretation of the picture in any later work on Rembrandt. Hearing it from him by word of mouth, it certainly seemed to me to be both interesting and convincing—as it happened I was looking at the picture in the Hague only a few

weeks later, having heard in the interval of Dr Hastie's sudden death—and it is a reading that is entirely in harmony with the deeply thoughtful and religious nature of the great master. “Standing at the boundaries of the real world,” says M. Emile Michel, in his fine work on Rembrandt, “and that invisible world which envelops us and appeals to us at the most solemn moments of our life, he passes at each instant from the one to the other and compels us to turn our thoughts thither.” The study of this picture seems to have made a deep impression on Dr Hastie, of which we have evidence in one of his sonnets:—

“A sudden flash, a pause, a thrill of joy—
 And all the Master's thought was clear revealed;
 And that deep truth in beauty long concealed,
 Was born in thought, which time will not destroy.
 'Mong streaming thousands, like a thoughtless boy,
 I oft had sought the spell its colours wield;
 But only gazed as beasts stare on a field,
 Nor could the higher, finer sight employ.
 But now I brought a deeper sense of things,
 As I went hurrying to it through the Hague,
 A life by Death unveiled in light and shade;
 And when I turned I seemed to feel soft wings,
 A strange new yearning, a sensation vague
 Of some still grander truth that will not fade.

THE LEIDEN SCHOOL AND THE
ETHICAL SCHOOL

THE LEIDEN SCHOOL AND THE ETHICAL SCHOOL

SCHOLTEN AND CHANTEPIE DE LA SAUSSAYE

I HAVE now to give some account of the views of two contemporary writers, who are generally recognised to have been the greatest theologians that Holland produced during the nineteenth century—Jan Hendrik Scholten and Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye. Scholten was born in 1811, and La Saussaye in 1818, and we may date the beginning of their influence about the middle of the century. What La Saussaye said of himself—that he was a theologian at heart and by profession—may be said of both. When the young Scholten, who had been appointed to a theological chair in a dwindling northern university, heard that steps were being taken to transfer him to a philosophical chair at Leiden, he would not listen to the proposal. He knew wherein his strength lay, and suspected that this

was merely a scheme to render him harmless. Both were able thinkers, quite at home in the movement of philosophical thought in Germany from Kant's time downwards. Neither of them, however, confounded philosophy with theology, although, perhaps, the most radical difference between them was that, in La Saussaye's eyes, Scholten did not sufficiently observe the distinction. Both would have accepted Kant's description of philosophy as a torch-bearer walking in front of her royal mistress, but they would have regarded it as presumption on the part of the servant, if she were to take her seat on the throne of the Queen of the Sciences. Another point in common between these otherwise antagonistic theologians, was that both stood, theologically, on what Hooker calls the "Geneva platform." Unlike the Groningen theologian, they identified the Reformed Church in Holland, in its origin and in its history, with Reformed theology, and the task of theology therefore presented itself to each of them in the same light—namely, to develop Reformed theology in such a way that it might become an adequate expression of the

thought and life of the Church in their own time. In his criticism of Scholten's *Doctrine of the Reformed Church*, La Saussaye quotes the saying, *Il faut juger des écrits d'après leur date*. And we must keep this principle in mind in looking, in this lecture, at what may be called the dogmatic work both of Scholten and La Saussaye. I remarked in a former lecture that historical criticism was slow in penetrating into Dutch thought, and about the middle of the century it cannot be said to have had much influence on religious thought. The first edition of Scholten's book on *Doctrine* was published in 1848-49. All his important work on New Testament criticism was done after this date, and it was not till 1864 that he discarded, in his book on the Fourth Gospel, the traditional theory of its authorship. It was not until 1854 that Kuenen, with whose views on Old Testament criticism he was in complete sympathy, became his colleague at Leiden. There can be little doubt that if Scholten had been able, in later years, to recast his dogmatics, there would have been some important changes. In the same way, while La Saussaye's work in dog-

matics was suggestive rather than systematic, if the ethical school, which numbers among its adherents the highest authorities on Biblical Criticism in Holland at the present day, were to attempt to carry out his suggestions in the sphere of dogmatics, which they seem to be in no hurry to do, considerable modifications would probably also be made.

Scholten, as a student at Utrecht, had the advantage of living in the house of his uncle, Van Heusde, whose influence on Dutch thought during the second quarter of the century I have already noticed. For two years he was minister of a country parish where the old Calvinistic doctrine was still cherished, and it is to this experience that he attributes—like Dr Kuyper, a generation later—his interest in Reformed theology. On his appointment as a divinity professor at Franeker, he delivered an inaugural lecture on Docetism, which he regarded as the most formidable theological error of the time, and maintained the orthodox doctrine of the true humanity of Christ against the school of Groningen. Although the Frisian University was blessed with a theological faculty—indeed,

at this time its only faculty—it was not encumbered with divinity students, and Scholten was thus enabled to pursue his own theological studies without distraction. It was abolished in 1844, while Scholten was still adorning one of its chairs—the Dutch Government having decided that the institution could be more profitably utilised as a lunatic asylum. He was soon called to a more important sphere of work at Leiden, where he spent his active life, and where he died in 1885. Scholten's first lecture at Leiden took the form of a defence of the thesis that the Christian religion vindicated its divinity *in animo humano*—thus signalling his opposition to what Dutch theologians term the rationalistic-supernaturalism that had been in vogue during the early years of the century. His dogmatics are to be found, in a more general form, in a Latin textbook, entitled *Dogmatices Christianæ Initia*, and, in clear and vigorous Dutch, in his work on the *Doctrine of the Reformed Church*. An enthusiastic pupil has described the latter work as an epic, an inspired and stately poem, rather than a system of divinity,—a somewhat

dubious compliment. La Saussaye, on the other hand, says that he devoted two years to its study, and found neither pleasure nor profit in the task. My own impression, on reading the book, was that for a scientific treatise on theology it was uncommonly interesting and, on a second reading, that it was not very well put together. I think it is Van Hamel who says that Scholten was too much of a polemic to be an artist. It is a book that had much influence for a time in Holland and that led the way, as we shall see in a later lecture, negatively rather than positively, to the later development of religious thought in that country. I mentioned in my first lecture that the Dutch Church in 1841 adopted a new formula of subscription, requiring candidates for the ministry to give their adherence to what Scholten interpreted as the fundamental principles of Reformed doctrine, and that he accepted this as a call to the theologians of the Church to define these. The change in the formula implied that the body of specific doctrine was no longer generally accepted as an intellectual expression of the faith of the Church, but that, at the same time,

there were certain fundamental principles which are stable and unquestionable in the Reformed Church—principles that, as Churchmen, we cannot go behind. To understand the aim of his book, we must keep in mind that Scholten takes for granted that the religious consciousness, which expressed itself in a certain specific shape, in life and doctrine, at the time of the Reformation, is continuous and essentially identical with the religious consciousness of the Reformed Church in his own time. While he attempts, in the course of his inquiry, to show that Reformed theology, in its formal and material principle, is a purer expression of the Christian faith than Roman Catholic theology and Lutheran theology, his main object is not to apologise for Reformed doctrine, but to show what, in the light of its own fundamental principles, it ought to be. This task, Scholten held, devolves upon the theologians of the Church, and in the performance of it, he held further, they must not be hampered by a hierarchy on the one hand—by which he means, in the present case, the General Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church—and by popular ideas and

wishes on the subject on the other. I may remark in passing—it is a point to which we shall return when we come to look at La Saussaye's views—that the opinions of theologians on what ought to be the doctrine of the Church have no significance unless they express the actual faith of the Church, as it lives in the Church as a whole, and further that such opinions can have no force as doctrine, but are merely pious opinions, unless it is derived from what Scholten terms a hierarchy, in some shape or form—whether it be a Synod of Presbyters or a Council of Bishops, or one whom the Church chooses as her spokesman. Looking at the question historically, the Church seems invariably to have followed some such course as I have indicated.

The inquiry into the fundamental principles of Reformed doctrine Scholten regards as a purely historical one. He goes back to the Confession of Faith of the Reformed Church and to the writings of its early theologians, and discovers two fundamental principles, a formal and material. The formal principle is the Bible; the material principle is the doctrine of

God's Absolute Sovereignty, and especially His Free Grace in Christ Jesus as the only ground of salvation. In an instructive chapter in Dr Hastie's "Croall Lectures," he compares Scholten's formula with those of Schweizer and Baur, and points out its superiority to both. Schweizer, influenced by Schleiermacher, defined it as the absolute dependence of man upon God, thus giving it an anthropological character, while Baur, in attempting to restore its original theological character, reduces it to a metaphysical abstraction in the shape of "the Absolute Causality of God." When Scholten's book first appeared, the point around which criticism chiefly turned was the question of two fundamental or ground principles. Doedes, the New Testament scholar, stood alone, as far as I know, in holding the popular idea that the Bible was the only fundamental principle of Reformed theology. Sepp, La Saussaye, and others, held that Scholten's formal principle could not be regarded as a fundamental principle at all, either in the Lutheran or in the Reformed Church. In the one case the principle of Justification by Faith only, and in the

other that of God's Absolute Sovereignty, were the principles from which they set out, and the principle of the Authority of the Bible was a second thought, as it were. They did not begin with the Holy Scriptures but came to them. In La Saussaye's criticism of Scholten's *Doctrine of the Reformed Church*, published in 1857-58, he has some remarks on this point which may be noticed here. In positing a double principle, La Saussaye holds that Scholten is influenced by, and apparently making a concession to rationalistic supernaturalism. Both, I may say, are seeking to get beyond this position to a deeper ground, which both believe to be that of early Reformed theology. In rationalistic-supernaturalism La Saussaye sees a despairing effort to maintain the doctrines of the Church when their religious significance has been lost sight of, thus satisfying neither the mind nor the heart of the Church. The place that Scholten gives to the Bible in his system is that which it came to occupy in theology as the result of eighteenth-century rationalism, and not its original place. Protestantism did not arise from the study of

the Scriptures — a common prejudice, La Saussaye remarks, which Scholten, of course, did not share. It was not exegetical differences that separated Lutheran and Reformed theologians from one another and from the Roman Catholic Church. The Reformation was a *Levensrichting*—a religious and ethical movement that found expression in a creed—a faith that was able to express itself articulately. The question of the place of the Bible and its authority, La Saussaye goes on to say, was a secondary one, and arose in connection with that of the Church. Calvin does not begin with the Bible, but with the immediateness of the God-consciousness, and the Confessions of the Reformed Church follow him in this. He agrees, therefore, with Schweizer, in making the formal principle dependent upon the material. One may admit the force of all that La Saussaye urges, and yet hold that much might be said for the position that Scholten takes up at the outset, if one keeps in mind the aim he had in view. He is not dealing with the Reformation as a spiritual movement, but with its theology. Even if Scholten was

influenced to some extent by a later theology in giving the formal principle the place he does in his system, the fact that it had come to occupy the place of a fundamental principle in the Reformed Church—a comparison of the Westminster Confession with the early Scottish Confession is instructive on this point—would seem to indicate that there was something in its very earliest statement that led to this.

Before tracing briefly Scholten's development of his formal principle, I must turn for a moment to his Latin text-book on Dogmatics, in which he expounds certain ideas which underlie the discussion. He does away with the distinction between natural and revealed religion as a false opposition. *Patefactio* is universal. God is present, and operates and manifests Himself everywhere and always in nature and in history. *Patefactio* has two forms—an external, which he terms *φανέρωσις*, or *manifestatio*, and an internal, termed *ἀποκάλυψις*, or *revelatio*. Neither is confined to the Christian religion. The organ by means of which the manifestation becomes revelation is the human spirit. The Christian religion is the perfect *Patefactio*

in both forms, and in this case the manifestation becomes Revelation in the human spirit, when, in union with Christ, the κάλυμμα, or veil of sin, has been removed. Scripture—passing on from the fifth to the sixth chapter—is neither manifestation nor revelation. It is not even the instrument of these, but indicates the instruments, which are nature and history, especially the person and mission of Christ. *Erravit igitur vetus dogmatica*, when it co-ordinated nature and Scripture as the instruments of *Patefactio*. Scripture, then, is defined as the instrument of the instruments of a divine manifestation, which, under certain conditions, becomes a divine revelation in the human spirit. Let us now turn again to his doctrine of the Reformed Church and see how he treats of Scripture here. He begins by looking at Scripture as the source and norm of Christian truth from the point of view of Christianity as an historical religion. Christianity is the religion which Christ founded by word and deed, and we must go to Scripture for a knowledge of this. He makes a distinction between the Bible and the Word of God, which it contains—the divine manifestation of

his dogmatics. The two things have been confounded, but the distinction is one that is implied, if not expressed, in the Confessions of the Reformed Church, and one that we are bound to make if we are true to the formal principle of that Church, for they are distinguished in Scripture. He would eliminate from the idea of revelation or the Word of God all that is purely historical—even the sayings and doings of Jesus recorded in the Gospels—the historical credibility of which he does not call in question, and would retain only what satisfies the test which he goes on to expound in the longest section of his book, on the Recognition of God's Word in Scripture by the Testimony of the Holy Spirit. This Scholten defines as the human reason and conscience, purified in communion with Christ, recognising the truth of God's Word as presented in Scripture. "The *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti* is the correspondence that we find between the divine revelation in the human spirit—the reason and conscience—and the Word of God in Scripture." I think Scholten fails here to do full justice to the Reformed doctrine. The Reformed

divines were thinking less of the subjective side than the objective. They were thinking of the Divine Spirit, of which Scripture was the vehicle, rather than of the human spirit; of a truth that has an authority in itself—an authority that it enables the human spirit, under certain conditions, to recognise. "It is necessary," Calvin says, "that the same Spirit that spoke by the mouth of the prophets should enter into our hearts and quicken them, that they may be persuaded that the prophets have faithfully represented that which they received from above. Being illuminated by His power, we believe, not on the strength of our own judgment, nor on that of others, that the Scripture is from God." The formative or educative aspect of Scripture is overlooked, and the same remark applies to his brief occasional references to the function of the Church—"the depository," as Calvin puts it, "of the divine treasures, and the guardian of the truth." "Our weakness," Calvin goes on to say, "does not permit us to leave this school—the Catholic Visible Church—until we have spent our whole lives in it as scholars. To those to whom God is a Father

the Church must also be a mother. There is no other means of entering into life, unless she conceives her sons and daughters in the womb, and gives them birth and nourishes them at her breasts."

Having established himself on the impregnable rock of God's Word in Scripture as vouched for by reason and conscience, Scholten goes on to argue that this foundation can never be undermined by historical criticism. He gives ample evidence to prove that the early Reformers felt themselves much less bound to the letter of Scripture than their successors did. In the story of the Creation, for instance, Calvin says, "Moses was thinking of us rather than of the stars, as was fitting in a theologian." "We need not trouble ourselves about the building of the Ark except in so far as it has to do with the building up of our own soul." "The Gospels," Scholten concludes, "as historical records of the life of Jesus, are exceedingly imperfect, but their religious value would remain unaffected, even if we were forced to ascribe to them no historical value. As a religion Christianity would still retain its value and its truth."

So far from rejecting the substantial historical accuracy of the Gospels, he holds that to do so would be an absurdity. "The Christian religion, so harmonious and pure, could not have been the product of a perplexed and powerless *Zeitgeist*, but is the masterpiece of a single person, who realised the religion in His own life, and from whose Divine Spirit have flowed the treasures of knowledge and wisdom, of faith and love, of peace and salvation, which the New Testament, on every page, discloses to the believer."

In the second volume of his work Scholten treats of the material principle of Reformed doctrine—God's absolute sovereignty and free grace in Christ Jesus, as the only ground of salvation. His method is to review the principle historically, as it appears in the teaching of Jesus, in St Paul's strife with Jews and Gentiles, in the Pelagian controversy, in the rise of Protestantism, in the controversy with the Socinians and Anabaptists, as more fully developed in the Reformed than in the Lutheran Church, as successfully defending itself against the Remonstrants and the later aberrations that

have arisen in the bosom of the Reformed Church ; and his final conclusion is that this principle, taken along with the formal principle, as he has explained them, would form a basis for the union of all Protestant Churches, " which is so much to be desired."

I do not propose to take you over all this ground—it lies outside my subject—and I propose to reserve my notice of the ethical aspect of Scholten's theology until my final lecture, when I shall look at it in connection with the rise of the ethical schools of theology in Holland, which may be said to have originated in a revolt from Scholten's system. But before leaving him, in the meantime I may give my general impression that the fundamental material principle of Reformed theology, as it emerges from Scholten's crucible, fails to express adequately what seems to me to be the fundamental principle of the Christian faith. The strong accent which is placed on the idea of God as Creator and absolute Sovereign seems to throw into the shade the full significance of the doctrines of the Trinity and of the Person and Work of Christ. Reformed theology took

over these doctrines as they had been defined in the early Church, and they are deeply embedded in its system. Whether this was defensible on the ground of its formal principle is a question that Scholten does not discuss. He points out, however, that Calvin, as an exegete, interprets almost all the passages that are used as proofs for the doctrines on the Trinity and on Christ in a different sense from that which is usually given to them in dogmatics. A more important question suggested by Scholten's exposition is whether the distinctively Reformed element in the doctrine of the Reformed Church, which had its vital religious ground in a desire to remove everything that could be called creaturely between the soul and God, can be organically connected with a set of doctrines that arose in the Church out of a vital religious impulse to find a bridge between the two, or rather to explain the religious life in which such a union was felt to be realised. Christian theology, as I conceive it, is merely an effort on the part of the Church, guided by the Holy Spirit, the principle of its life, to explain to itself, as best it can, the

meaning of its life. Doctrine is not the Beatific Vision. "Of God," as Hooker says, "our soundest knowledge is to know that we know Him not, as indeed He is." While retaining the Trinitarian formula, the impression one gets as Scholten and other Dutch scholars expound Reformed theology, is that Grace is concentrated in a kind of deistic God, and that it does not give full force to the idea of God as revealed in the Incarnate Logos, and as communicated to the Church by the Holy Spirit. La Saussaye suggests the view that there were two lines of thought in Calvin—two foci around which his theological thought turned—Election and the *Unio Mystica*, connected with his sacramental theory, and that as one comes into prominence the other recedes. He compares Reformed theology, as it was developed, to a barrel in which the staves are all sound enough, but in which something has gone wrong with the hoops—a serious defect in a barrel. His proposed remedy we shall presently have to consider. As a specimen of how Scholten deals with Reformed doctrine, testing it by its fundamental principles, I shall give briefly his

views on Justification. In the complex idea of salvation, justification comes to the front in Protestant theology. According to Dr Kuyper this is characteristic of Lutheran rather than of Reformed theology, in which, he holds, sanctification was always the main element. Justification, thus Scholten puts it, means righteousness in the sight of God. It is founded on free grace and that again on God's absolute sovereignty. All idea of human merit must be excluded, even the merits of Christ. We are regarded as righteous in the sight of God in Christ and by means of Christ, but not for Christ's sake. As Gomarus, the famous theologian of the Dort Synod, puts it, "The cause of election is not in the merits of Christ, or in anything outside God," a phrase that hardly seems to square with Trinitarian doctrine. The idea of penal or vicarious satisfaction and of Christ's merits Scholten traces to the old leaven of Semi-Pelagianism, and regards as unreformed. We are not justified on account of anything that Christ did for us, but, united to Christ by faith, which is the gift of God and is the power of seeing in Christ a

revelation of perfect obedience and righteousness, we become potentially what Christ is actually, and can be regarded as satisfying the divine justice. It is an axiom of Reformed theology, La Saussaye points out in his review of Scholten, that justification is inseparable from regeneration. This would seem to lead us to what I have spoken of as the second focus round which Calvin's thought turned, as when he says in the "Institutes" that the forgiveness of sins is appropriately subjoined in the Apostle's Creed to belief as to the Holy Catholic Church. Our sins are forgiven by the ministry of the Church, and we are to seek forgiveness of sins only where the Lord has placed it. Testing Reformed doctrine by its own fundamental principles, Scholten finally comes to the conclusion that the distinction between election and reprobation has only a temporal significance, and that all men are predestined to eternal salvation, and he endeavours to show that this view is consistent with its formal principle. And from his ethical standpoint, which we have still to consider, that God's grace moves the human will irresistibly

to seek and to find peace and salvation in the will of God, it is impossible to see how one can come to any other conclusion.

Passing from these abstruse themes, we turn to one of the most interesting personages in the drama of Dutch ecclesiastical life. The name of Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye is little known outside Holland, and this is not surprising. His son—the present Professor of Ethics at Leiden—says of him that he has left behind him no system, written no standard work, and founded no school, but he has left on many an indelible impression. If La Saussaye founded no school, in the stricter sense of the term, he gave, at least to religious thought in Holland—to use a characteristic word—a *richting* or trend, which has influenced it profoundly, and it is an influence that has lasted and grown. At the present day, I may mention, in the University of Leiden, the names of his distinguished son—a high authority in the science of Comparative Religion, Professor Wildeboer, who recently succeeded Dr Oort in the chair of Kuenen, and Van Nes, the recently appointed Professor

of Dogmatics ; and, at Utrecht, Professors Valetton and Daubanton, who have all sat at the feet of La Saussaye. During most of his life he was a "solitary fighter," as Loman described him in an article in the *Gids*. He was accused of obscurity, and this was usually put down to his style, and this again was sometimes accounted for on the ground that he thought in German, preached in French, and wrote in Dutch. Tiele, who could write well, and seems to have known it, remarks in a review of La Saussaye that style is like a woman, who will heap her favours on any one who will pay her attention, but if neglected, will have her revenge. La Saussaye turned a deaf ear to the complaint. He found people could understand him perfectly well when they agreed with him. When they differed from him they called him obscure. Professor van der Wijck says of him that there is no more open-hearted writer. His book is not a book, it is the man himself.

Chantepie de la Saussaye belonged to a family of Huguenot refugees who left Normandy about the middle of the eighteenth

century. He studied at Leiden, where he had Clarisse and the Groningen theologian Van Oordt among his teachers. He considered it a privilege to have studied in this university at a time when the four Divinity professors belonged to different schools of thought. It taught him to keep himself free from the authority even of professors. In 1842 he was appointed minister of the French church at Leeuwarden, signing the Formularies of Unity, not as literally expressing his faith, but as an attempt to describe the same religious life in which he participated. At Leeuwarden he was only a few miles distant from Scholten at Franeker, awaiting the *decretum horribile* that was hanging over the once famous but now deserted University. La Saussaye had a congregation in the Frisian capital, but it was a small one, and he too had ample leisure to devote to his favourite studies. The Dutch Reformed Church includes a certain number of congregations in which the French language is used, as well as four in which English is used. The former are known as *l'église Wallonne*. They owe their origin to two flights of French-

speaking refugees that settled in Holland, the first at the time of the Reformation, and the second in the eighteenth century. As these became absorbed in the Dutch population, the need of French churches became less, and their number, which had been about fifty, was reduced at this date to seventeen. Many of them were swept away at the time of the Revolution, along with some Scottish churches that had survived till that period, among them Campvere, which still stands on the roll of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland as entitled to be represented, although all that remains of it is a splash of whitewash on the wall of the ancient church against which it once stood. I have sometimes wondered how my two Walcheren churches were able to weather the storm in which so many time-worn ecclesiastical barks went down. The first minister of the one was the famous Cambridge divine of Elizabeth's time, Thomas Cartwright; and among the earliest lay members of the other was one whose name will never be forgotten—a name that, in his own phrase, moves the heart more than with a trumpet—that of Sir Philip Sidney.

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The Middelburg records show that the French Préfet during the Incorporation was most persistent in asking the Kirk Session for returns, but these worthy men had always the courage to swear that their numbers were something over a hundred souls. There is no reason that I know to doubt their veracity, even if there should be less reason to doubt that some of them had intimate dealings with Dirk Hatteraick, as their predecessors with their brother elder, Saunders Moonshine of Wolfshope—"a zealous elder of the Church when on shore, and when on board his brig as bold a smuggler as ever ran out a sliding bowsprit to the winds that blew betwixt Campvere and the east coast of Scotland." This, however, is a digression, and I must return to my proper subject.

After a few years spent at Leeuwarden, La Saussaye followed Scholten to Leiden as minister of a more important French church. In 1862 he went to Rotterdam as one of the ministers of the Dutch church in that busy mercantile city, and ten years later, when he was fifty-three, he was appointed a professor in the theological faculty of Groningen. This

post he held for about two years, until his death in 1874. La Saussaye had been several years at Leiden before he stepped into the arena of ecclesiastical and theological controversy. In 1852, a society, consisting of members of the Dutch Church, was formed, which called itself *Ernst en Vrede*. It was not a homogeneous group. All were at one in thinking that things were in a bad way in the Church, and that something must be done to try to mend them. They were like a number of physicians—they described their method as medicinal—gathered around a patient, whom they all believed to be seriously ill and suffering from a complication of diseases—Groningen theology, Opzoomer's empiricism, the school of Scholten, and Modernism, which issued from the two latter, and was just beginning to run its course. They did not agree, however, as to which disease was the most dangerous. La Saussaye was always inclined to look on Groningen theology as almost a symptom of returning health. What the society did was to begin with the party in the Church with which they felt most

in sympathy—that of the *Réveil*, described in the first lecture. The party was disuniting, and drifting, as it seemed to them, on two dangerous rocks—that of Donatism on the one hand and that of a rigid Confessionalism on the other. A journal was founded which took the name of the society, and La Saussaye, Beets the poet, and Doedes the critic, became its editors. La Saussaye was soon left as sole editor, and, latterly, almost as sole writer, and after six years the society was dissolved and the journal discontinued. His early efforts as an ecclesiastical and theological reformer were discouraging, but he left the lists with undiminished faith in the soundness of his ethical principle and in its future triumph. His chief aim, while connected with this society, was to conquer Donatism and to win over Groen's Confessional party to his own way of thinking. He regarded the *Réveil* as a genuine revival of Christian life—as the work of the Holy Spirit in the Church. But Christian life, if it is to maintain its purity and its fulness, must have a theology. In other words, it must be put into a sufficiently definite intellectual

form to mark it off from what is not distinctively Christian, and to do justice, at the same time, to all its essential elements. From this point of view he saw much that was defective in the *Réveil*. The work of divine grace in the Church was concentrated in what was termed conversion, and the work of the Christian was to seek the conversion of others on the same fixed lines. The idea of the Church was coming to be limited to those who believed they had undergone this process, and all others were regarded as being outside its pale. Regeneration, the implanting of the principle of the Christian life, which resides and works in the Church, was identified with some later moral crisis which may manifest itself in a variety of ways. In the first number of the journal—in a programme drawn up by Beets—the accent is placed on the visible Church as manifested by the sacraments. La Saussaye's second aim was to win over the Confessional party, which had grown up, as I explained, in opposition to Groningen theology. Here the contest turned on two points. The first was the relation of the Church to its Creed or

Confession ; the second was its relation to the State.

To both Groen and La Saussaye a Church without a Confession was unthinkable. A Confession is meant to express the collective Christian consciousness, and is sanctioned by the governing ecclesiastical body, on whom the duty lies, in normal circumstances, of exercising discipline in matters of doctrine. La Saussaye held, however, that the Church was not then in a position to exercise discipline on the ground of the existing formularies, which had ceased to be an adequate expression of the growing life of the Church. The task of theology—of the teaching office recognised in the Reformed Church—was to find a more satisfactory intellectual form in which to express its faith and life. Groen, on the other hand, who was not a theologian but a statesman and lawyer, had no difficulty in accepting the formularies, and wished to have them enforced by legal means and with the assistance of the State.

The relation between Church and State was another point on which he differed from Groen.

Although as keenly opposed as Groen to the revolutionary principle, he looked on the separation of Church and State which took place at the Revolution as a blessing. It confined the Church to its own special work, which is to Christianise the public conscience. The public conscience more or less Christianised, and not the Church with its specific creed, asserts itself in the State, viewed as a legislative and administrative machine. It was this theory that led to La Saussaye's wavering attitude on the question of religious education, and weakened his influence with the party he was seeking to win over. La Saussaye was a thinker who had an aversion to ideology—to abstract theories—and on his own principle it might be said that there can be no abstract theory on the question of the relation between Church and State. It must depend on the actual facts of the case. In a democratic State, which Holland had become, everything depends ultimately on the public conscience—La Saussaye's middle term between Church and State. But the public conscience may be sufficiently Christianised to wish the Christian faith to be taught in the

public schools, and also—which seems to go along with it—to regard the Church as a supremely useful national institution, which, while it does not act immediately on the State, the public conscience may think it desirable to maintain as a means of Christianising itself. As a matter of fact, the Dutch Church was never perhaps more under State control and less free to do its special work than during the fifty years that followed its disestablishment, and after more than a hundred years there are Dutch Churchmen who say that the Church is still less free than it was under the old *régime*.

La Saussaye had two ends in view when he joined the society *Ernst en Vrede*. He completely failed to win over what became the Confessional and Anti-Revolutionary party to his way of thinking. They took their own way, and we shall have to return to them at a later stage, under the leadership of Dr Kuyper, Groen van Prinsterer's successor. And instead of conquering the Donatists, it almost looks as if the Donatists had conquered La Saussaye. The journal began by placing the accent on the visible Church and the sacraments. In "La Crise

religieuse en Hollande," which La Saussaye wrote in 1860, the visible Church has only a relative value, and in the action of Groen's party he sees a deplorable confusion between the Church and the Kingdom of God. The change, in his point of view, was due partly, I think, to the contest in which he had been engaged, and partly to the development of his theological ideas. The writers who influenced him most were the Swiss theologian Vinet, and Schleiermacher. In Vinet he found what he called the wholesome principle of individualism—the indwelling of Christ in every believer who confesses his faith freely and personally. But he saw that Vinet does not express all the fulness that is in Christ—that the Holy Spirit does not isolate the individual from the Body of Christ, but makes him a living member of it, at the stage of development which it had reached; that the witness of the individual conscience does not arise and exist outside that of the collective consciousness of the Church. Vinet, he thought, neglected the significance of the Church as an historical institution and as possessing an educative character. The one-sided-

ness of Vinet he wished to correct with the help of Schleiermacher, and the one-sidedness of Schleiermacher with the help of Vinet. Schleiermacher, he thought, placed the right of personality in the background, and weakened the ideas of responsibility and guilt—guilt and personality being, in La Saussaye's view, inseparably connected. He never succeeded in reconciling the two points of view which he brings together—the individualistic and the organic—and he seems to have fallen back more and more upon the former.

In one of his later writings, in 1867, he accepts in its ethical form Calvin's principle of an *ecclesiola electorum in ecclesia* as the *levenskracht* of the Church. There were two distinguishable forms of the idea of an *ecclesiola in ecclesia* in vogue in Holland, both of which he regarded as defective. There was, as we have seen, what he calls the Donatist form as it appeared during the *Réveil*, a Church of the converted, those who professed to be conscious of having undergone a certain experience and to be cultivating a certain form of unworldliness, and, in both respects, this seemed to him to be

a narrowing of the true idea of the Church. On the other hand, chiefly among the Calvinistic dissenters, there was the idea of a Church of the Elect, consisting of a fixed but unknown number, who had been predestinated to salvation in the secret counsel of the Almighty from all eternity, which they envisaged as some "dark backward and abysm of time," a view that Dr Hastie, in his "Croall Lectures," characterises as "virtually deistic—separating eternity from time, God from the world, God's ideal purpose from its embodied reality." Eliminating these two forms of the idea, there is a sense which seems to be that of La Saussaye, in which the strength of the life of the Church, as of every society, consists in its most living members; in the case of the Church, in those whose Christian faith and life are strongest and most vigorous. But the term *ecclesia* or *ecclesiola* as applied to such is inappropriate, because it suggests the idea of a separation between the more highly gifted and the less gifted members of the Church, "who," in the words of the Heidelberg Catechism, "are by Baptism ingrafted into the Church of God."

La Saussaye never succeeded in reconciling the two points of view regarding the Church, suggested to him by the study of Vinet and Schleiermacher. The same remark applies, I think, to his theology in general. In his numerous occasional writings, there are suggestive thoughts on almost every Christian doctrine, but he never attempted to work them up into a system. It was his belief that he lived in a time when it was impossible to construct a system of theology. Dogmatics seemed to him to be in a state of dissolution, of chaotic confusion. As a science it could never be completed any more than any other science—that would mean the end of the world, but something might be done to define its aim and its method. Like Scholten, he tried to rise above the old school of rationalistic-supernaturalism, and, like Scholten, he believed that Dutch theology must be based on the principles of Reformed theology. In this they were at one, but in what I take to be the three leading ideas in the mind of La Saussaye, they were totally antagonistic, at least so it seemed to La Saussaye. He accused Scholten of idealism, or rather ideo-

logy. The task of theology, La Saussaye holds, is to explain the life of the Church. Theology is the life of the Church from the point of view of truth. What he terms the ethical principle, the first of his three leading thoughts, is the principle of that life. As more fundamental, I shall begin with this. The term ethical, as used by La Saussaye, was a stumbling-block to the theologians of his time, which he tried to remove by doing his best to explain that it was not used in the sense which they supposed. In reply to the criticism of De Groot and others, and to a leading member of Groen's party, Baron Mackay, who had applied to the ethical school the words of the serpent to our first parents, "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," he explained that the ethical principle was not to be identified with the moral faculty, the deliverance of the individual moral consciousness. A theology based on an ethical principle leads one to think of a theology like that of Kant. La Saussaye, however, in a sketch of the movement of speculative thought in Germany from Kant to Hegel, maintains that Kant's chief merit was not in his practical

philosophy, but in his theoretical, as developed by his successors, in whom the old antithesis of subjective and objective had disappeared to make way for a theory of immanence. 'Kant's ethical principle, viewed in its isolation from all other reality, floats in the air. The cry of a return to Kant, which was beginning to be heard, was only justifiable in so far as moral truth was not sufficiently represented in later speculative systems. But another point of departure must be sought than that of the categorical imperative. Otherwise it would be a return to a point of view which scientific thought had passed beyond. Burger, a Dutch philosopher, in taxing speculative philosophy with mysticism, had indicated, without intending it, the true cause of the sterility of the old supernaturalism—the mystic element was absent from it. Not only theoretic thought demands a God who is not isolated from the world, but this is equally a need of the heart, of the religious life. But the religious need, which demands the immanence of a personal God, or, to use a Scriptural term, the Holy Spirit, could easily give birth to a mysticism, passive and quietist, if we

neglected to search in a philosophical analysis, that is to say, in dogmatics, for the knowledge of its true nature.' In 1863 the Synod of the Dutch Church, in a report on the different tendencies of religious thought then prevalent, described that of La Saussaye's school as ethical-mystical, a designation that he willingly accepted. "This at least is what we wish to be. Mysticism is our ground. We are rooted in God. At least we believe so. The ethical is the revelation of the life hidden in Him. What might be objectionable in the single word 'mystical,' as if we were given over to visions and ecstasies, is removed by the corrective term 'ethical,' which expresses the fixed laws to which the religious life is bound."

This "ethical principle" was closely connected in La Saussaye's mind with that other principle which I have mentioned—that the task of theology is to explain the life of the Church. 'The Church is a living body revealing the life of the Holy Spirit. That life as revealed in the Church is progressive, and theology must likewise be a progressive science. Theology and the Church are inseparable. To separate it from the Church

would be its deathblow. Outside the Church we have merely individual dreaming. The criterion of the science is in its object. That is a fact or series of facts which science may explain, but does not create. As a science it is like every other science, but its criterion is in the reality which the theologian has to explain.' He had a contempt for what he called "Gedankendingen," and in Scholten, he thought, the real thing seemed to be always slipping from his grasp. Scholten vigorously and somewhat scornfully repudiated the charge that his theology was idealistic, in the sense which La Saussaye gave to the term, and I am not sure that La Saussaye always kept in view the necessary limits of science, which it cannot trespass without ceasing to be science. It deals with ideas and ideas only, which explain, more or less, the facts of the natural and spiritual world, and the latter must be put into the form of ideas if we are to have a science of theology at all. La Saussaye's principle, that the Christian theologian must be in actual touch with his subject—that he must live the life which he describes—the old

Reformed principle of a *theologia regenitorum*, is, however, a sound one, and is at least implied in Scholten's principle that the Christian Apocalypse is for the soul that has been purified from sin in union with Christ. If I might venture on another word of criticism, I should say that La Saussaye has failed to reconcile the two principles I have just indicated, and that this was due to the fact that he was never able to come to any definite theory regarding the Church. Neither the term mystical nor the term ethical, which are both individualistic in their ordinary acceptance, nor a combination of both, as he suggests, seem adequate to explain the principle of the life of the Church. Even in the sense in which he uses the latter term, the soul is alone with God, who is viewed as immediately present in the moral consciousness, and in mysticism it is the individual soul that feels itself united to God in some condition which excludes any intelligible explanation, and on that account, as he remarked in his opening lecture as a University professor—his son tells us he was deeply interested in the mystical writers—can find no

place in theological science. In passing from the idea of the Holy Ghost to that of the Holy Catholic Church, what would seem to be needed is a principle that can explain the corporate life of the latter, and transform ethics and mysticism, which are elements in it, into what we may call Christian ethics and Christian mysticism.

A third fundamental principle that La Saussaye insists upon in opposition to Scholten is that of the intimate and essential connection between the Christian religion and its history. God does not reveal Himself only in impersonal nature and in the religious consciousness of the individual, but, and here especially, in the movement and in the facts of history. To Scholten it seemed a matter of little consequence how we had come to a knowledge of Christianity. To La Saussaye it was a matter of the utmost consequence. The Church was bound to its origin in the historical Jesus and in the history of the people of Israel, not merely from the point of view of historical development, but in the light of the principle of the Christian life. In the Christian life the supernatural and the natural—the divine and the

human—are really present, not merely as an idea of the infinite and the finite in the mind, but as spirit meeting with spirit. Theological science, he says, has not yet solved the problem of this union, but it must not ignore it, nor let one term be lost in the other. ‘The supernatural has no place in history, unless it has a place in the Christian consciousness. It is not a means to religion, but religion itself. But as present in the Christian consciousness, we can see a Personal God—the Divine Logos revealing Himself in the historical life of the Israelites, and as the consummation of this in the Christ of history, in whom was realised the perfect union of the divine and the human.’

La Saussaye always felt himself to be a spiritual son of Calvin. During the brief period he was a divinity professor, he used to advise his students to dig for the treasure hidden in Reformed theology. In one of his later writings—comparing Luther and Calvin—he says: “We see—and in this opinion we do not stand alone—with the exception of the strict Lutherans we have almost all German theology on our side,—we see in Luther the

man of the initiative, the hero, the man of action and of power ; but in Calvin the man of the future, the thinker, who carried within himself a world of thoughts—thoughts that came into the possession of the Church after his death, and are not even yet fully possessed by it. . . . Calvinism has undergone a baptism of suffering, and is now awakening, purified and sanctified, from its grave. . . . Our task is to unbind the ethical Calvin from the scholastic, or rather, let me say, to develop in the Reformed Church the gift of God that was in him. The consciousness of this calling binds us with child-like love and piety to the Reformed Church—to her historical origins, her whole history, her Confessions and her liturgies. We feel that we are the sons of those fathers ; we have the consciousness that what lives in us and what we are pressing forward to is the fruit of their work and the aspiration of their spirit. . . . The Christology of the Reformers,” he goes on to say, “may have not yet been freed from the bonds of scholasticism ; their whole dogmatics may therefore be defective and in need of a total revision. In their anthropology lies their

greatest merit, and on this basis the whole building can be reared anew, without thereby being altered in its essence." This suggested emendation, I may add, brings to my mind a saying quoted some time ago by a professor in this University: "'They maun hae new tops and bottoms,' said the Scottish cobbler of the old pair of boots, 'but the auld whangs will dae.'" Half a century later, in our own day, the views of La Saussaye's school on dogmatics seem to be much less hopeful. The science of comparative religion, a radical criticism of the Old and New Testaments, evolutionary theories, and the reign of Modernism, of which I have to give an account in my next lecture, intervene. "The hour," the younger De la Saussaye says, "perhaps has not yet come to build up a new system with a firm hand. We have come to see too clearly the defects of the old system. At present philosophical criticism has to have its say. In any case, we must wait till God raise up some one who can do it."

MODERNISM

MODERNISM

IN following the course of religious thought in Holland during the nineteenth century, we come now to what may be described as the dominant school of thought in the third quarter of the century. I refer to Modernism in its earlier phase, which must be distinguished from the Ethical Modernism that succeeded it. The period during which Modernism, in this earlier form, flourished, was a comparatively brief one. We may date its rise as a school about 1860, or a few years earlier, and by the middle of the second half of the century its strength was well-nigh spent. It was a period of much theological activity in Holland. It witnessed the rise, with Tiele, of what Max Müller was fond of calling, with a kind of fatherly interest, "our young science"—the science of comparative religion. Kuenen's epoch-making work in Old Testament criticism began, and most of it was carried out, during this period.

The historical criticism of the New Testament had long been kept at arm's-length by the Dutch, but now Scholten took the subject in hand and treated it with his characteristic vigour. It is not, however, the theological scholarship of the period that I propose to deal mainly with in this lecture. To give even a general outline of this would require many lectures. I propose rather to look at the movement with which these and other distinguished scholars were associated as a phase in the development of religious thought in Holland, and to indicate its underlying principle. From this point of view the history of early Modernism seems to me to be intensely interesting and instructive. It is a school that has passed in that country into the sphere of history. We can trace its beginning, its course, and its end. It has been condemned by the criticism of history—the most decisive form of criticism. It was an attempt to combine a positivist or naturalistic view of life and of the world with the Christian faith, in a wide sense of the term, and it was demonstrated, clearly and conclusively, that it could not be done. At the same time, much of

the theological work that was done by the eminent scholars to whom I have just referred has undoubtedly a permanent value, if not in the form in which it left their hands, at least as leading the way to what may be more satisfactory theories with regard to the historical origin of Christianity. Instead of attempting to summarise the work of scholars like Tiele and Kuenen, who are as well known in this country as in Holland, it will perhaps be more profitable, when we come to look at this aspect of the movement, to indicate some of the later developments of biblical science and the science of comparative religion as they are to be seen in the work of scholars of the present day, like Professor Valeton of Utrecht and Professor Chantepie de la Saussaye of Leiden.

The earlier phase of Modernism had its origin, chiefly, in the empirical philosophy of Opzoomer, partly in the idealistic theology of Scholten, and, to a certain extent, in the influence on the Dutch mind of the Tübingen School of New Testament criticism. Until the rise of Modernism the historical criticism of the books of the Bible was a subject at which

the Dutch had looked askance, confining themselves mainly to textual and conjectural criticism, and, in Introduction, following the old-established lines. About the middle of the century the subject was evidently much exercising the minds of the younger theologians. In his "Rigting en Leven," Alard Pierson gives what he calls a page from the inner life of a divinity student at Utrecht about 1850, in which he describes how the faith of the young student began to be troubled by the study of biblical criticism. Not without a touch of malicious humour, he ascribes the beginning of his doubts to the orthodox Van Oosterzee. His "Life of Jesus" had recently appeared, and was greedily opened by the young student and the introduction devoured. From that moment a change came over his inner life. The introduction spoke to him of the authenticity of the Gospels. What! the authenticity of the four Gospels! Is that a matter about which men can argue for and against? Does their authenticity rest on the testimony of the Fathers of the Church — fallible men? Never, till he learned it from the professor, had he known

that so much could be urged against the Gospel of Matthew, for example; or rather that its authenticity must be said to be absolutely incapable of proof. And so with the other Gospels; and thus the seeds of scepticism were first sown in his mind. Turning to the writings of the Germans, he finds that the New Testament embraces a part of the literature of the Early Church, a literature which reflects the strife of parties. All the New Testament was put together in the interest of one or other of the conflicting parties, or of a catholicity which they were trying to reach. Pierson's colleague in the French church of Rotterdam, Albert Réville, who became afterwards the first Professor of the History of Religion in the College of France, in his "Good Right of the Modernist School," which was published about the same time as Pierson's "Rigting en Leven," draws a very similar picture of the experiences of a young student at Geneva and Strassburg. "We were not a little surprised when we discovered how shaky was the foundation upon which, as we were told, the whole building rested—how much uncertainty existed

with regard to the canonical value, and the purity of the text of the books which we were yet taught to regard as clothed with an infallible authority." Like Pierson, he, too, turns to the Germans. It became clear to him that the Bible, as such, could have exercised no influence on the origin of Christianity and of the Church. "If there were Christians and Christian communities before the books of the New Testament were collected, existed, or were acknowledged at least, then the doctrine that the Bible was the only foundation of Christianity and of the Church seemed to be historically false. We see, further, that the strict unity of the doctrine, which must be the distinctive mark of a collection of books miraculously inspired to serve as the basis of a system of doctrine, was merely an illusion of the past."

I mentioned in a former lecture that Busken Huet popularised the views of the Tübingen School in 1858 in a book entitled "Letters about the Bible." The importance of this book lay in the fact that it was written by one who was perhaps the best Dutch writer of his time, and

it was very widely read. The book takes the somewhat odd form of a correspondence between a young woman living in the country, who is troubled with difficulties about the Bible, and her brother, a stockbroker, who has given his leisure hours to the study of recent German criticism. Huet admits that the thing could have happened only in Holland. In a series of long letters, in reply to those of his sister, the brother explains how those difficulties had been removed in his case, and that there is nothing in them that need disturb "the pure and simple faith that has come down to us from the Prophet of Nazareth." The theologians of Groningen, whose system, as we have seen, rested on the historical appearance of Jesus Christ as revealed in the Gospels, were especially strenuous in combating the new critical views. A son of Hofstede de Groot took the same young woman in hand—Machteld was her name, our more familiar Matilda—and represented her as engaged in another long correspondence with a cousin, a licentiate of divinity, who takes her through a course of biblical criticism on Groningen lines. De

Groot's book I have not read, and I do not know in what mental condition he leaves the unfortunate young woman. One can suppose that the result of it all must have been somewhat bewildering. Busken Huet was the first of the Modernists to leave the Church. He took to journalism, and was for a time editor of the *Gids*, the leading literary periodical in Holland. In his new profession he met with difficulties of other kinds, which made much noise at the time, but do not concern us here. He was at times bitter and sarcastic, and, like most Dutch writers, given to analysing the national character. "Small-mindedness" was a trait that seemed to him to characterise his countrymen, and this, he thought, was due to their absorption in ecclesiastical and theological questions. If they could shake themselves free from these they would be able to attain to a wider and saner outlook on things. Since Huet's time Dutch literature has emancipated itself pretty completely from what he regarded as the baneful influence of Church and theology, but that the process had led to the result he anticipated is questionable.

In the early years of the Modernist movement, in 1864, Albert Réville described it as not pledged to any philosophical principle. "In principle it is critical." And quite recently Professor Chantepie de la Saussaye says of it that "it had no common philosophical principle. Among its adherents were monists and dualists, advocates of determinism and of free-will." But it would be to take a superficial view of it if we regarded it as the outcome of biblical criticism. The biblical question is only an aspect, and if we look at the subject in its true proportions, only a subordinate aspect of a wider problem, that of the natural and the supernatural. While differing on other points, all the early Modernists were at one in rejecting the supernatural in every shape and form. "Like the red thread that is woven through the cordage of English ships of war," a recent historian of the movement, himself a Modernist, remarks, "there runs through the whole history of Modernism in Holland, anti-supernaturalism." When the movement had finished its course, or at least changed its character, two questions were discussed regarding its origin.

The first was whether it could be regarded as, properly speaking, a religious movement, or whether it was merely an intellectual movement. On this point I shall only remark that I agree with Professor Oort, who adopts the latter view, in opposition to Van Manen and others. The other question was whether it originated in the empirical philosophy of Opzoomer or in the theistic monism of Scholten. I have already indicated that I consider its main source to have been Opzoomer's philosophy. By anti-supernaturalism, or more simply naturalism, which was the common rallying-ground of the Modernists, they meant a view of life and of the world which finds their final and only explanation in the law of cause and effect. Opzoomer tried to combine with this view certain religious ideas which were really inconsistent with it. For a time the Modernists tried to do the same, and the significance of the movement lies in the gradual discovery that the two points of view were irreconcilable. In his dogmatics Scholten had avoided the question in the form in which it came to the front during the Modernist controversy. "Finding," as the elder De la

Saussaye puts it, "no philosophic interest to deny the miraculous, and no religious interest to affirm it, he allowed it to stand. His indifference on this point," he goes on to say, "proves his absolute inability to explain the phenomena of the religious life *et le fait chrétien*. Busken Huet, recognising no better than his master the religious significance of the miraculous, seemed to him to be much more logical in denying it." "When one abandons the old apologetic method and attaches value only to a psychological apologetic, the miraculous loses its significance, and if it does not acquire it otherwise, it becomes an isolated element, entirely superfluous in a system of theology. The Empirical School, on the other hand, was within its rights in opposing the duly ascertained laws of nature to the traditions of an uncritical age and a superstitious people. The only means of defending the miraculous is to show its relation to the religious life, in other words, to recognise it as an essential element in revelation." On this point, however, Scholten, while continuing his skirmishes with Opzoomer, came into line with the rest of the Modernists.

Enthusiasm was a prominent note of the movement in its early days. It appeared as if a new and brighter era was beginning in the religious history of the country. The work of the Reformation, which had been only half done, was to be completed. Religion and science were to be reconciled. In 1861, when the movement was still young, Loman sounded a note of warning in an article in the *Gids*, which fell upon deaf ears. Whatever one may think about Loman's views with regard to the historical origin of Christianity—they have never found any vogue in Holland, and it was not till twenty years after this date that he published them—his thoughtfulness, wide culture, and eloquence entitle him to a place in the first rank of the theological writers of the century. In this article he casts scorn on the claims of the Liberals to be the legitimate successors of the Reformers. He has no fear of publicity in the discussion of religious subjects, but what alarms him is that so many within the Church, while talking loudly about truth and freedom, things as dear to him as to them, were displaying their own arrogance and shallowness.

Much in the movement seemed rash and inconsiderate. Taking the term "Modern Theology" as describing the school that proceeded on the principle, that theology can only continue to bear the character of science on the condition that it adopts and follows the fundamental laws that prevail in the other sciences in their modern development, and the aim of his article is to show that there was much in what calls itself modern theology that could not be organically connected with the modern consciousness, and that was not fit to work upon it as a vital force.

Alard Pierson was by far the most brilliant representative of Modernism in its earlier phase. He is famous in Holland as a man of letters as well as a theological writer, but it is in the latter aspect that we have to look at him. He was the son of an Amsterdam merchant who had been held in high esteem in the party of the *Réveil*, and it was in this circle that he grew up. At Utrecht he fell under the enchantment of Opzoomer, and adopted both his philosophical and theological ideas. He became minister of the French

church at Rotterdam, and is said to have been a popular preacher and a good pastor. If we judge by the dissertation on Practical Theology in his "Rigting en Leven," one might say that, had he remained in the Church, he would have made an excellent professor of that subject; and the blue vein of sentimentalism, which runs, as Van Hamel says, through the white marble of his literary work, and is bluer than usual in this section, might not have been a serious drawback. Pierson, as La Saussaye correctly describes him, was a dialectician rather than a profound thinker. He was a man of wide reading—the classical and mediæval periods attracting him especially—and he had a true feeling for art in its various shapes—music, painting, and literature—and was himself the master of a singularly graceful style, to which he owed his great influence more than to anything else. Up till 1865, when he left the Church, renouncing both Modernism and Christianity, his standpoint was practically the same as that of Opzoomer. In 1863 he wrote his "Rigting en Leven"—School and Life—and

as this book was regarded as a kind of manifesto by the party, I shall notice briefly some of its leading ideas. Pierson found the animating principle of the movement in a passion for reality—a phrase that became a kind of watchword in the school. It differed in principle from orthodox Protestantism and the older theological Liberalism as much as it did from Roman Catholicism. The idea that Protestantism was based on an infallible Word of God, and not also on tradition—that of the Jewish and of the early Christian Church—was a pure hallucination. As to the question of faith and works, one who felt the modern passion for reality could see in it only a play of words. Everywhere there was a difference, but nowhere a difference on fundamental principles. Any thinking being who could be satisfied with the one ought to be satisfied with the other. Roman Catholics asked for the prayers of the saints, Protestants for those of their ministers. What distinguishes Modernists from Roman Catholics and Protestants, including the older form of Liberalism, is the entire rejection of

supernaturalism. To this we are led by the only logic the modern mind can accept. All our knowledge is derived from perception, and all we can perceive are phenomena in their connection and relation. The only connection and relation which they disclose is that of cause and effect, and this principle is absolutely universal. Among the phenomena of experience we find that of religious feeling. This the empirical philosopher must recognise as a fact, as one of the characteristic properties that assign to man his place in the series of beings. Pierson distinguishes between faith in God, which rests immediately on religious feeling, and a knowledge of His existence, and labours, unconvincingly as it proved to himself, a year or two later, to show that on the principle of his "respected master" we can advance with a high degree of probability from the subjective feeling to an objective truth—"not to perfect certainty, which, however, does not hinder a rational being from cherishing a very warm religious feeling, as it is not as the result of a process of reasoning that the feeling has originated." This religious feeling, on being

analysed, is seen to be a feeling of dependence and to contain an ethical element, which we ascribe to the Being on whom we feel dependent. The ethical character of a religion depends on the stage which human development has reached, and the highest moral perfection now conceivable is that of love. Whether this conception could have come to us apart from Christian tradition is an idle question. In reality we are indebted for it to the Christian tradition under the influence of which we have grown up. The empirical method has led him to the idea of a God who is love, but the passion for reality raises another question. If the nature of God is love, He must reveal Himself as love in our experience of life and of the world. There is nothing specially distinctive in Pierson's theodicy except its eloquence. It is a subject that naturally gives scope to his gift of dealing with the pathetic. His general conclusion is that things are sometimes in reality—as they fall within our own experience—far from being as bad as they seem to be, while, on the other hand, they sometimes seem to be so very bad that it would

be absurd for us to attempt to bring them into any kind of intelligible connection with the idea of a God, whose nature is love. In the fact of their utter inexplicability he finds a ray of light. The world is like an open book : on the left-hand page stand written secret signs ; on the right we read, " I will wipe away all tears from their eyes." Tradition, he goes on to say, makes us pious ; the empirical method enables us, as thinking beings, to remain pious. Under the guidance of this method our knowledge of the divine has become circumscribed, and it has now only the character of probability. Of the relation of the Perfect Being, who must be Perfect Love, to the world, we can hardly say anything. All we can hope to be ever able to say of it is that it is some kind of causality which we cannot describe. Our knowledge of the world teaches us that the law of cause and effect is universal. If every effect has a finite cause, which, in its turn, is the effect of a cause just as finite, it follows that God never and nowhere acts immediately, and that there is nothing in the world that can be ascribed to God as its nearest cause.

This view of the world is not inconsistent with a belief in a God whose nature is love. We can still speak of God as acting and ruling, but on the strength of this religious conviction we must not expect or hope for anything that cannot flow out of the system of nature, or look for any effect the possibility of which is not grounded in the system of nature. We must never forget that every effect depends on a chain or a whole system of finite causes. Our world-science will always hinder us from believing in the immediate working of God, our religious faith from being fatalistic, seeing that we surmise that in the system of nature there is the expression of the highest wisdom and love. This faith cannot be expressed in a dogmatical or a metaphysical form, but only in the language of poetry. The passion for reality, however, is satisfied if we frankly accept it as poetry. Poetry being the natural language of religion, the cultivation of the æsthetic faculty becomes a matter of the utmost importance, and, even in the interest of the religious life, can hardly be begun too soon. We ought, perhaps, to revise the well

known rule, and to say—*Rien n'est vrai que le beau*—because the truly beautiful alone can be regarded as the fitting expression for the exalted emotions of the heart.

Having settled the question of Christian faith, in his second volume Pierson turns to that of the Church. In the present condition of the Church the passion for reality finds much to criticise and condemn. Truth, simplicity, and naturalness are painfully lacking. To avoid misunderstanding he thinks it would be well to do away with the word Church altogether. Jesus did not found a Church, and did not intend to do so. In our day there is only one reason that makes the existence of ecclesiastical associations still desirable. Only in this way is it possible for persons to be appointed who, for a certain cash payment, will devote all their time and powers to whatever may be regarded as favourable to the interests of morality and religion. His definition of the Church is prosaic enough. "A Church is a society established, or, at least, kept in existence, with the aim of paying men, either from its own funds or from funds

supplied by the State, men whose function it is to be the leaders of the moral and religious life of the society." Its relation to the State must be precisely like that of any other society. It cannot claim independence, but must enjoy the greatest possible freedom. I pass over his Pastoral Theology, noticing one characteristic remark. The rising leaders of the religious and moral life of the society must devote much time to the study of French literature as the only means of freeing themselves from a certain unwieldiness of style, which Pierson thinks is naturally peculiar to a Dutchman. The answer to the question, what the religious leaders are to preach about, he finds in the simple and beautiful subscription-formula then in use in the Dutch Church: "The grace of God revealed in Jesus, *i.e.* the divine love in so far as Jesus has made this plain and palpable in His Person, His teaching, and His history." Back to Jesus must be our watchword. Here we have no subtle doctrines and elaborate solemnities, but something so beautiful, so soft, so mild that we only need to know it in order to love and to accept it. Much may

be legendary in the story, but what a Person that must have been around whom such legends could have grown—legends that breathe a spirit of the tenderest love and gentleness. The Church, in the old sense of the word, had done a great work in civilising Europe: one thing it had not done was to preserve the pure religion of Jesus. He willingly credits it with the undying honour of having laid the foundation of modern social life in Europe. The idea of humanity is a discovery of the Church, and her services in this respect he eloquently sets forth; but she has outlived her historical vocation. The Roman Catholic Church has become a stubborn old woman who would be entirely pushed aside if she had not remained as faithful as ever in her works of charity to the poor and the sick. And Protestantism and the Church are two ideas that neutralise each other. Only two courses are open: either to return to the decrepit Church of Rome, or honourably and courageously to give up the idea of a Protestant Church. Protestantism has had three centuries to dream its dream, and it is now high time for it to awaken to a world of realities. Pierson's

vision of the real world, or of the world that it is now our task to realise, is that of a social humanism, in the bosom of which there will still be a place for ecclesiastical associations with the function he has described—a social order held together by love, in which the individual devotes himself to the common good of all, and cultivates his powers to the utmost in order to be able the better to serve humanity.

An enthusiast for reality might reply that what Pierson leaves us with is a Christianity which has neither soul nor body, that any life or substance that his ideas actually possess they owe to their association with the obstinate old woman and her illogical daughter. The Roman Catholic Church may be an obstinate old woman, but two years later Pierson came to see that her stubbornness in denouncing naturalism as inconsistent with the Christian faith was perfectly justifiable. The best criticism of Pierson and the movement he represents is to be found in the development of his own ideas and in the history of his school. If religious feeling—the feeling of dependence,

with a certain ethical colouring—is merely a link in an endless chain of finite causes and effects—and this, he came to think, was the only way in which Opzoomer's philosophy could allow him to regard it—there was no ground for ascribing to it any absolute significance whatever. It cannot link us with a Being who reveals Himself in the course of nature, or supply us with any reason for believing that such a Being exists. Man, with his ideas and feelings, is merely a product of nature. Pierson, therefore, cut himself adrift from the Church and renounced Christianity. He described himself as a humanist. His former ideal of a society united in the pursuit of truth and goodness and beauty he still retained, but we must not delude ourselves any longer, he held, by supposing that this was the religion of Jesus. The belief in a personal, transcendent God was the foundation of Jesus' view of life and of the world, and that belief science cannot sanction. Christian faith belongs to an irrevocable past.

Pierson's action raised a violent storm among the Modernists. Scholten hurled his thunder-

bolts at him. His colleague in the French church of Rotterdam, Albert Réville, waxed eloquent in a series of French writings on the right and duty of Modernists to remain in a Protestant Church, which had room in it for naturalists and supernaturalists, and "was a safe haven where those who are worn out by the storm of life can find rest, and where those who are called to the strife can gird themselves with fresh courage and strength." The main argument brought against Pierson was that he looked at the question from a Roman Catholic rather than from a Protestant point of view. Thus Kuenen, who took a leading part in the controversy, argued that while the Reformed Church had accepted supernaturalism, and while her Confession was supernaturalistic, a belief in the miraculous was characteristic neither of Christianity nor of Protestantism. The modern view of the world leaves no place for a divine supernatural revelation. But this is the result of a historical process, and a development of this kind the Church is free to follow. The Church is not a society that exists for maintaining and propagating supernaturalism.

When she was founded she could not express her faith in any other form. But to suppose that she must retain this form or die is to misunderstand her essential nature. In virtue of her Christian and Protestant principle she has a right to reform herself. The aim of the Church is to cultivate religion and morality in the Spirit of Jesus. The assertion that Modernists are no longer Christians is groundless, and rests on the notion that the significance of Jesus is to be sought, not in what distinguished Him from His contemporaries, but in what He had in common with them.

Having broken with Modernism, Pierson felt isolated in Holland, and retired for some years to Heidelberg. He was much gratified on being appointed by the Baden Government to a professorship in the university. He attended the lectures of his colleagues, Helmholtz and Kirchhoff, made a more thorough study of Kant's philosophy, and surprised his countrymen by an article in the *Gids* in 1871, directed against the philosophical standpoint of his old master Opzoomer. About the same time he published an interesting lecture on Vinet as

a literary critic. In the preface to the lecture, which took the form of a letter to a Dutch friend, he says that when he laid down his office in 1865, he felt that he was obliged to take his place among the Positivists on the ground of his philosophical principles. Since then he has passed three years in solitude and study. These years have not been fruitless. He has now come to the conclusion that he made a mistake when he thought it was his duty to sacrifice his Christian consciousness to his philosophical principles. The undeniability of that consciousness has forced him to subject his philosophical principle to further criticism, with the result that he now sees that Positivism, as well as every other method which must end in Positivism, is fundamentally false. In the lecture he compares Vinet, simply in the capacity of a literary critic, with Taine and Sainte-Beuve in the same capacity. Literary criticism, he holds, always goes along with a definite view of human nature. Vinet's view is that of Christian faith, while Taine represents that of Positivism, and Sainte-Beuve that of scepticism. His aim is to show that it was by

virtue of his Christian faith that Vinet was able to take a more sympathetic and penetrating view of human nature from an artistic point of view than either of his distinguished contemporaries—that he could, for example, appreciate mediæval Christianity, which Taine failed to do, and that he could be more impartial in his judgments than Sainte-Beuve. I am afraid that Pierson's own example as a literary critic somewhat tells against the force of his argument. As a Christian, a Positivist, and a sceptic he had always a good deal of that special kind of merit that he justly admired in Vinet. The book—"Een Levensbeschouwing," a View of Life—in which he gives the fruit of his Heidelberg studies, presents a far more sombre view of life than one might have expected from his earlier utterances, when it seemed to him as if he had passed from darkness into the sunshine. The day that is dawning has now become grey and chilly. The world is not good from our point of view, and we cannot judge of it as a whole. It is true we can form ideals of right and of beauty, which have at least a relative value. We are

not mere spectators of time and existence, but can act on the world. We can work and suffer in order to make it more habitable for those who shall come after us. But even this outlook remains doubtful—democracy coming in like a flood with its uncertain influence on human culture. On his return to Holland he was appointed Professor of the History of Art in the University of Amsterdam. His last article in the *Gids*, in 1895, was on Ethics, in which, as Van Hamel puts it—who describes Pierson's life as "a tragedy of vain search"—he attempts to chase the Absolute from its last entrenchment.

We must now return to Modernism, from which Pierson dissociated himself in 1865, and look at it, generally, as an ecclesiastical and as a theological movement. In 1865 the Confessional Union was formed to counteract the efforts of the Modernists, and the struggle in the Church turned on three points which were successively hotly discussed for several years. The first was the question of the baptismal formula, which the Modernists wished to make optional, and some of them

actually discontinued its use. The Confessionalists appealed to the General Synod, demanding "that the sacrament of baptism should be celebrated in a Christian manner, in other words according to the institution of Christ." The Synod replied, somewhat pedantically, that "in a Christian manner" was not equivalent to the words "according to the institution of Christ"; that it has not been proved that Jesus spoke the words regarding baptism in St Matthew's Gospel; and that St Peter, in the Acts of the Apostles, had used a different formula. In the circumstances, however, they decided that it was not only desirable but necessary that the ancient formula should be retained. The Modernists returned to the attack, and in 1870 the Synod decided that, as the deviations from the ancient formula were few and insignificant, as there was no existing law on the subject, and as their function, under the present constitution of the Church, was merely administrative, they could take no action in the matter. The second question, in which the struggle was even hotter and more prolonged, was regarding Confirmation. Before Confirmation the

catechumens are required to pronounce their adherence to the doctrine of the Church. It was not until after a ten years' conflict that the question was finally settled by requiring of the catechumens the acceptance of the doctrines "in their spirit and substance." The third question was connected with the body of regulations, which form a kind of written constitution, and was drawn up when the Church was reorganised in 1816. One of the articles imposes on ecclesiastical authorities the duty of maintaining the doctrine of the Reformed Church. This question opened the way for much discussion, and gave rise to schemes of reorganisation that have as yet come to nothing. In passing from a question that does not concern us here, I may give the opinion regarding it of a distinguished Dutch theologian. Professor Chantepie de la Saussaye, of Leiden, wrote in 1902: "We cannot restore the old; we cannot make the new. God must do it, and God will do it. . . . Let us confess and serve God in the Church. Ecclesiastical forms we cannot renew from the outside. Personally we can breathe

life into them. Let us not—at anyrate let us as little as possible—discuss the question of the Church and its artificial construction. Still less let us help to break it down. Destroy it not, there is a blessing in it.” What I have to notice, however, is that by this time the Modernist party seems to have spent its strength. Two reasons can be given for this. In 1867 popular election, in the case of vacant churches, was introduced or made optional—a measure that the Modernists as a rule favoured, while orthodox opinion seems to have regarded it as unreformed—and it soon became apparent that the Modernists had little popular sympathy. Another reason which brings us back to our proper subject was a split which took place in Modernism itself—a split that goes deep down to the philosophical principles on which the movement was based, as I shall try to explain in my next lecture.

The period I am dealing with was, as I remarked at the outset, one of remarkable activity in Holland, and if my purpose was to give an account of the contributions made to

theological learning in that country, the space I can give to this aspect of Modernism would be utterly disproportionate. I shall limit myself to an attempt to indicate its general character in the light of what is my main object—to trace the course of the movement of religious thought. With Tiele, the science of comparative religion may be said to have come into existence in Holland. It is a science that has several names, comparative religion, the science of religions, and the history of religions. One name—that of the science of religion—which Max Müller was fond of giving it, seems to me to be a misnomer. Some of us were just entering the university when this science was born, and we can remember the fascination that this distinguished writer's persuasive style and imposing manner of displaying his treasures had for our youthful minds. In the *Manual of the History of Religions* by the Professor of Ethics at Leiden, there is a suggestive remark in his section on the Religion of the Greeks—a remark to which one may give a wider extension than it has in the context. He is noticing the fact that the study of the new science has led us to the

unexpected conclusion that the actual religion of the Greeks was often very different from the idea to which we have hitherto been accustomed. We know, for example, that the Homeric poems, which were regarded formerly as the sacred gateways to Greek religion, are cycles of general literature that have only a somewhat remote relation to that religion. But, he warns us, let us be on our guard against being carried away by a sudden interest in questions that have hitherto been too much neglected, and thus judge wrongly of the *ensemble*. We must not lose sight of the fact that the religion of a people comprises the religious ideas that penetrate the intellectual life and inspire the thinkers and the poets. This remark, with regard to the Anthropological School of our day, is applicable, it seems to me, to the whole science, under whatever name we may designate it, at least during its early history. Tiele's idea was to make the science of comparative religion the centre and foundation of all religious science. He maintained that theology would be destroyed if it had not the courage to become a science like all other sciences. As in every other

science, we must begin with the collection of facts, the phenomena of the different religions. These must be examined, compared, and sorted, and in this way, confining ourselves to anthropology and psychology, and excluding the speculative method, which had been condemned in all other sciences, we were to rise to a true theory on the subject. At the present day M. Hubert, in his introduction to Professor Chantepie de la Saussaye's work, which has been adopted in France as the standard work on the subject, proposes to exclude theology as such entirely from the science. He defines religion, which is left undefined by La Saussaye, as belonging to the philosophy of religion, as the association of two terms, human society or the individual on the one side—he himself adopts the social point of view, and suggests its application as a corrective to the animistic theory—and on the other side a metaphysical truth that imposes itself, reveals itself little by little, and the knowledge of which implies practical obligations. The latter he would exclude from the science in question. The balance is not equal; the gods and the infinite weigh too heavily.

The object of religious thought is too interesting to await the minute examination of all its forms. What Tiele takes as the facts on which the science of religion is to be based, while they are facts to the student of anthropology, and the only facts that he has any special interest in—to the student of the science of religion they are not, it seems to me, the subject-matter of his science at all. They are various theories that are present implicitly in the various rites and practices and myths of different religions, which have just as much or as little interest and value for him as, for example, the theories of primitive races on their own subjects have for the astronomer, the psychologist, or the political economist. Totemism, M. Hubert says, is primarily a system of juridical and civil organisation rather than a religious system, and Dr Frazer, he remarks, has pointed out its economic aspect. Our whole intellectual and social life is rooted historically in the remote past, but if a theologian is bound to go to school among primitive races—I am not calling in question the relative value of such studies—he has at least the right to

ask all other scientific men to keep him company.

All the writers I have hitherto mentioned in this lecture belonged to the Dutch Reformed Church. Tiele belonged to the Remonstrant community, which dates from the time of the Arminian controversy. He was born in 1830 and died in 1902. He began his career as minister, first of a village congregation and afterwards of one in Rotterdam, and was at the same time busy laying up stores of knowledge in his special subject—finding relaxation in verse-making, in which he had some skill. He came to the front in 1859 with a review of Scholten's *History of Religion and Philosophy*. Scholten's pioneer work fell far short of Tiele's standard. "In the treatment of such an important branch of history," he wrote, "it is not a matter of indifference to see the principles of all true science so shamefully trodden under foot." This was not the kind of language Scholten was accustomed to, and he could ill brook criticism. Nevertheless Tiele and he became and always continued to be the best of friends. His first important work, which appeared in

1864, was on the ancient Persian religion. It was one of a series of books on the principal religions, which included, amongst others, Kuenen's well-known *Religion of Israel*, *Islamism*, by Dozy of Leiden, *Roman Catholicism*, by Alard Pierson, and *Protestantism*, by Rouwenhoff. In 1877 Tiele was appointed to the new chair of the History and Philosophy of Religion at Leiden, a post which he held along with a divinity professorship in his own theological seminary. Several of his works have been translated into English, and his Gifford Lectures belong to us as much as to his countrymen. In his own subject, in its widest range, he was the acknowledged master, and in this branch of science the Dutch, at the present day, are in the front rank. A word on the principle of classification adopted by Tiele will connect his name with that of his friend and colleague Kuenen, whose life he wrote. In 1882 Kuenen delivered the Hibbert Lectures in this country on National Religions and World Religions. Influenced by Kuenen, Tiele, who had formerly accepted this classification, now abandoned it. The opposition

between universal phenomena and national phenomena he no longer regarded as essential, and his final general principle of classification is that of natural and ethical religions. In La Saussaye's work the principle of classification is simply ethnographic or geographic, and, while including in the second edition a history of Hebrew religion by Professor Valetton of Utrecht, the Christian religion is entirely excluded from his survey.

In my notice of Kuenen I can afford to be even more brief than in that of Tiele. Pfeiderer, in his *Development of Theology in Germany*, "has scientifically annexed this distinguished theologian of the Netherlands," and we can put in a much stronger claim to do the same. Kuenen's *Prophets and Prophecy in Israel*, which appeared in 1877, owed its inception to a Scottish scholar, Dr John Muir, and it was through the medium of the English translation of his *Religion of Israel* in 1882—the year in which he delivered his Hibbert Lectures—that his views became generally known in Germany. I need not therefore go over the well-known ground of his modification of the

Graf hypothesis and the suggestive help lent by Colenso's investigation. For a sympathetic sketch of his life and character I can refer you to Professor Cheyne's *Founders of Old Testament Criticism*. Kuenen's graciousness is specially and rightly noted by Professor Cheyne. It is a characteristic that comes out clearly in all the controversies in which he took part. To the interruption in his studies which took place on his father's death, when he had to work for a time in the apothecary's laboratory, Dutch writers ascribe in some measure the "genuine Dutch exactness" which marks his work as a critic. He became a professor at Leiden, and as a theologian came under the influence of Scholten. They were "*geestverwaanten*" in the fullest sense of the term, and when they met to discuss theology and to smoke tobacco, as they frequently did, one likes to hear—when everything is changing in this changing world—that the great innovators strictly adhered to the old Gouda pipe. Outside the Free University of Amsterdam I do not know that there are any Dutch scholars who question the validity of Kuenen's purely

critical conclusions on any point, which, except to the specialist, can be said to be of real importance. Professor Valeton of Utrecht and Professor Wildeboer of Leiden, who both belong to what is known as the orthodox ethical school, may be taken as representatives of Dutch scholarship in this subject at the present day, and in their main lines both accept Kuenen's results with regard to the literary sources. Where they differ from him is in his reconstruction of the history of the religion of Israel, and above all in the theological presuppositions that underlie his whole view of the nature and development of Israelitish religion. In his inaugural lecture at Leiden three years ago Professor Wildeboer maintained that the literary critics had too readily assumed that ideas had arisen at the same time that they came to light in literature, and had given too little weight to what had probably existed as oral tradition both before and after the date of the penning of a document. Thus the Deuteronomic Code may have been a codification rather than a programme, and the Priestly Code the closing point

of a previous development. "In what proportion older materials," Professor Valeton says, "were used in the latter, it is difficult to determine. That a new form was given to them and that they were adapted to a new end is incontestable." To both scholars the prophets were reformers and not founders of the religion. Still the historical framework in which the various phases in the development of Israelitish religion are placed does not differ essentially from that of Kuenen's *Religion of Israel*. To Professor Valeton the pre-Mosaic period is practically unhistorical, and there is much force in the view that its religion was animism, although this theory does not fully explain it. Where they differ radically from Kuenen is in his theological and philosophical standpoint. This Kuenen has sketched in his *Introduction to the Religion of Israel*. "The religion of Israel is one of the principal religions, nothing less, but, also, nothing more. That there is no specific difference between these is beyond the shadow of a doubt. The old ecclesiastical view that Israel was chosen by God to prepare the way for Christianity is no longer tenable. We have

outgrown the belief of our ancestors." "In a rectilinear development of an ethical religion," his successor at Leiden holds, "out of the nature-religion of a nomadic race probably no one believes any longer. In the history of Israel, even when reconstructed in the light of critical results, there is a place left for an entirely special action and revelation of God, and its issue in Christianity seems to logically presuppose a special origin and history."

In any case, it seems to me that if we can still speak, as Kuenen does, of the design or purpose of God, and if we can regard Christianity as something more than a mere succession of historical and psychological phenomena, the standpoint of the Modernists needs to be revised, and an account of the efforts of Dutch theologians to get beyond it will be the main topic of my next lecture.

VARIETIES OF ETHICAL THEOLOGY AND
CALVINISM REVIVED

VARIETIES OF ETHICAL THEOLOGY AND CALVINISM REVIVED

THE phase of Modernism which I described in my last lecture may be said to have spent its force in Holland about the beginning of the last quarter of the century. A split took place in the camp of the Modernists into two schools—an Ethical and an Intellectualist—and after a controversy that lasted for some ten years the former was left in possession of the field. The Intellectualist form of Modernism, with which I was dealing in my last lecture, was based on the empiricism of Opzoomer and on the monism of Scholten, and was an attempt to combine a naturalism, which viewed life and the world solely under the category of cause and effect, with the religion of Jesus, by which was meant the life and teaching of Jesus stripped of a miraculous guise. This was followed, about the date I have indicated, by what may be termed a kind of ethical revolt, represented by writers like Van Hamel and Bruining. They sought the

Divine—the object of religion—in man's ethical nature. To a certain extent they adopted a dualistic standpoint—a complete dualism is a manifest impossibility. Their special views I shall notice at a later stage, but meanwhile their position may be defined generally as an Ethical Idealism that sought to maintain itself independently of a belief in a corresponding moral world-order. But there is another phase of Ethical Idealism that goes back to a considerably earlier date, indeed, to the very beginning of the Modernist movement. It originated with Hoekstra, who was for many years a professor in the Mennonite, or Old Baptist Theological Seminary at Amsterdam. Hoekstra was a learned and thoughtful and prolific writer, who has won a place among the ablest theologians of the country. Shortly after the appearance of Scholten's *Doctrine of the Reformed Church*, he wrote a book on *Freedom in relation to Self-consciousness, Morality, and Sin*, in which he combated the ethical views of Scholten. In this book and in earlier writings, Hoekstra expounds his own theory, which may be defined as an Ethical

Idealism, which is made the basis of a belief in a moral world-order. As the influence of the earlier phase of Modernism began to decline, this theory found many adherents, among whom Professor Oort and the late Professor Rouwenhoff, of Leiden, may be mentioned. Besides the two phases of Ethical Idealism which I have just indicated, I propose to consider, in the same connection, what is known in Holland as the Ethical Orthodox School, a school that had its origin, as I explained in a former lecture, in ecclesiastical and theological controversies that preceded the rise of Modernism. As distinguished from Ethical Modernism, this school may be said to attach itself more closely to what are termed the facts of the Christian life and of Christian revelation, while it seems to be feeling its way towards a more satisfactory intellectual formulation of these than ecclesiastical dogma is supposed to give. The younger Chantepie de la Saussaye of Leiden, and Professor Valeton of Utrecht, may be taken as its representatives.

We must first, however, take a glance at what was done in the field of New Testament

criticism during the period with which we are dealing. A clear and full summary of Dutch literature on this subject is to be found in Van Manen's *New Testament since 1859*, or, as he characteristically adds, "Early Christian Literature, for that is my work and anything else it shall not be." The book has been translated into German, and is doubtless known to all New Testament scholars. All I can do here is to notice briefly the books on the subject that were likely to influence the course of religious thought in its main lines. In this respect Scholten's *Gospel according to John*, which appeared in 1864, takes an important place. In his *Introduction to the New Testament*, in 1856. Scholten had accepted the Johannine authorship both of the Apocalypse and the Fourth Gospel. In 1864 his theory of the Fourth Gospel is essentially the same as that which C. F. Baur had given forth twenty years earlier. That he arrived at his conclusions as the result of an entirely independent study—*nemini me mancipavi* is his boast—no reader of his book can doubt. The subject is one that had been long in his mind. For a time he had

sought, like other scholars, an explanation of his difficulties in the theory of composite authorship. His final view was that while the last chapter came from a later hand, to which a certain number of interpolations in the body of the Gospel is also due, these are not of such an extent as to affect its substantial unity. No son of Abraham could have written it. The unknown author must have written his book about the middle of the second century, and in view of the theological speculations of that period. It is not, and it was not meant to be a history, but an historical drama by means of which the writer sought to convey his own ideas—ideas that are not those of the psychology and philosophy of our time, and must therefore be relegated from the sphere of dogmatics to that of the history of religious thought. The result, he held, would be a gain and not a loss to our knowledge of the historical Jesus, and the religion He taught. Loman, whose revolutionary critical theory still lay in the future, discussed Scholten's book the following year from the point of view of the Church and its faith. It seemed to him that it involved consequences that were

not yet apparent to Scholten. He detected a polemical intention in the book. The question that was agitating the Dutch Church at the time was : Can the Modernists remain in the Church ? Scholten had endeavoured to show that while the writer of the Fourth Gospel put his theology into the mouth of Jesus, he placed himself above apostolic tradition and even the personal teaching of Jesus. " You want to drive us out of the Church," Loman supposes him to argue, " because our views regarding Scripture and the Founder of Christianity are not those that were formerly accepted, but in this Gospel there is already present the principle of freedom from all tradition that we are claiming." Loman argues that while there might be some ground for this contention so long as the Gospel was regarded as giving the teaching of Jesus, Scholten's theory not only overthrew the Protestant principle of Scripture as the *unica norma fidei*, which he admits, but implies further a complete breach with historical Christianity. The theological school that felt itself most directly assailed by Scholten's book was that of Groningen, which bases its dogmatics on the historical

appearance of Jesus Christ. From one point of view the Groningen theologians might have regarded it as a victory, for on some important points, which he had formerly controverted, Scholten now accepted their exegesis of the book. One reason, among others, that Scholten gives for believing that the book was unknown to St Justin, is that to Justin the Logos became Man, while in the Gospel the Logos was made Flesh and pre-existed as human as well as divine. Still this would have been a barren victory to the Groningen School if the book had no historical value, and Hofstede de Groot published a translation with annotations of Tischendorf's recent book, *When were the Gospels composed?* introducing it as "the work of the first man of the time in the whole learned world." That Tischendorf was the first man in the learned world was a judgment that Scholten refused to subscribe. Possibly he thought the Groningen theologians might have found him nearer home. "It is one thing to hunt out old MSS., it is quite another to practise criticism in the true sense of the word"; and to show how this must be done he wrote his book on the

Earliest Witnesses as to the Writings of the New Testament. By means of external evidence, is his final conclusion, the authenticity of no single writing of the New Testament can be satisfactorily proved.

It was not until about 1880 that Loman began to give forth his Symbolistic theory. Loman's name is usually mentioned in this country along with that of Van Manen in connection with the Pauline question, but this was a secondary question in Loman's mind, and he was led to it in his attempt to solve a wider problem. He described Chantepie de la Saussaye as a solitary fighter, but he seems to me to have occupied an even more isolated position in the history of religious thought. His critical theories have found hardly any acceptance among scholars in Holland, and he cannot be identified with any school of thought. At the same time as a regular contributor for many years, on religious and university questions, to the *Gids*, the leading journal in the country, he must have exercised considerable influence. He was a man of unusually wide culture and an accomplished musician. If his

theories appear extravagant, the soundness of his scholarship was never questioned. Even Van Manen's friends admit that Van Manen was naturally headstrong and pugnacious, but one cannot think of Loman as having been moved by anything but a simple love of truth; and more, perhaps, than some among his contemporaries, he impresses one as having possessed the *sensus divinitatis*. When he took a leading part in the controversy that ended in the reorganisation of the theological faculties in 1875, he had been a professor in the Lutheran Theological Seminary at Amsterdam for some twenty years. About this time his eyesight began to fail, and he afterwards became totally blind, but this did not interrupt his work. "The historical growth of Christianity," he says, "was never so clear to my mind as in those days which for me could hardly be called days." In the university controversy there were two points for which Loman fought: the retention of theology as a distinct faculty, and the exclusion of dogmatics from it as a special subject of study. "Without God our knowledge loses its unity and our being its ground" was a text

on which he wrote a number of eloquent articles. The question was settled by allowing the Dutch Reformed Church to appoint two professors to teach dogmatics and practical theology in each of the universities. They were to be paid by the State, but not to be included in the faculty, which was retained—and all the chairs were open to members of any Church or of no Church. The ecclesiastical conditions of the time may have rendered this step necessary, but to exclude from a theological faculty the study of the only form of faith that has any practical interest in a Christian country cannot be regarded as an ideal arrangement. Still, if a Church thinks it impossible, or undesirable to formulate its faith, or has no common faith to formulate, the need for a chair of Dogmatics in a university might not seem to be very urgent.

Loman had never been satisfied with any of the theories that had been put forward to explain the historical origin of Christianity by eliminating the miraculous element from the narratives. The idea of looking in this way for a real historical personage, whose pure

unadulterated teaching is to be accepted as the faith of the Church, seemed to him to be utterly futile. If we rob the Jesus of the New Testament of His miraculous garment, what is left is not a historical Person at all. If the negative, analytical method were fully carried out, along with the miracles, many other features must be left out, and what would remain would be no historical Person whom we can call the Founder of Christianity, the hero whose Spirit rules the history of the world, the Master of us all. The conclusion that Loman finally came to, after he had published his Pauline studies, was that it was credible that a certain Jesus of Nazareth may have existed, a pupil of John the Baptist, a zealot for the Law, and exclusive in his attitude to Samaritans and Gentiles, who denounced abuses in the Temple service, was suspected by the Roman Governor as a possible leader against Roman rule, and crucified. A Christianity would thus have arisen in a purely Jewish, anti-Roman form, which was afterwards condemned by the Church as Ebionitism. The origin of Christianity, as we find it reflected

in the New Testament writings, was quite independent of this possible earlier movement, deriving from it merely the name of its possible leader as a symbol. Christianity in its origin was a Messianic movement among the Jews, of a spiritual kind, that arose after the War of Independence, and came to its full development in the second century, gradually absorbing certain elements of Greek and Roman culture. Israel had died on the cross at the hands of the Romans, to rise again in the Diaspora as the Christian Church. In this shape it was the ideal son of the Jewish nation, endowed with its tenacity, its unconquerable faith and prophetic enthusiasm, the suffering Messiah and servant of God, risen from humiliation and crowned with glory.

All the leading theologians of Holland took part in the controversy that followed. One of the first in the field was Professor Cramer, of Utrecht, who pointed out that Loman's theory was inconsistent with the authenticity of the four Pauline letters that had not been questioned. This led Loman to make a closer study of Paulinism, and the result appeared in

his *Questiones Paulinæ* in 1882-3, in which he attempted to prove that none of the letters came from the hand of Paul, that Paulinism represented a later stage of the Messianic movement, dating after the middle of the second century. The historical Paul may have been a missionary of the Messianic movement at an earlier stage, but the letters were more intelligible as representing a later development of it, and the view of Paul generally accepted was a psychological impossibility. Only a few years before this Loman had expressed himself very strongly on the side of the genuineness of the letters. In an article in the *Gids* he describes St Paul as one of the most remarkable figures in the history of religion. The four letters were undoubtedly from his hand. They give us the portrait of a living man. We can feel beating in them the heart of a great and earnest man. About the same time he described Alard Pierson's arguments against the genuineness of Galatians as far-fetched, and suggesting a caricature thrown off in a few minutes while the writer was not sitting at his

desk but *stans pede in uno*, and yet he confessed a year or two later that it was this caricature that first led him to doubt the genuineness of the letters. Clearly psychological improbability is a shaky foundation upon which to build a theory. The Loman controversy lies outside the scope of our subject. His hypothesis was attacked vigorously by the Leiden School, with Scholten at its head, and the last thing which that indefatigable theologian put on paper the year before his death—after his work on the Fourth Gospel he had written several critical books on the Synoptics on fairly conservative lines—was a reply to Loman. Looking at Loman's theory merely in relation to contemporary theological schools in Holland, it may be said, I think, to accentuate a truth that was too much lost sight of both by the school of Groningen and by that of Leiden, namely, that of the close connection that existed between the history and religion of Israel as a whole and the rise of Christianity.

But by this time the main current of religious thought had turned into another channel, in which not so much history as psychology and

philosophy were in question. The critical discussions I have briefly noticed may have accelerated this movement of thought, but it had its origin mainly in a revolt from the view of life and of the world that the Modernists had endeavoured to combine with the teaching of the religious genius whose true history was partly revealed and partly concealed in the Gospels. If the earlier movement was mainly intellectual, the movement we have now to consider, in all its phases, has a distinctively religious character. It is the cry of the human heart for the living God—a God who is near, and not far off. “Oh that I knew where I might find Him! that I might come even to His seat!” Scholten described his theology as theistic, and his view of the world as organic; but as he developed his system, and especially, as we have now to consider, its ethical aspect, it was essentially a naturalistic system, in which everything in life and in the world was brought under the point of view of a necessary succession of cause and effect, in which the individual man has a necessarily determined place. And this point of

view failed to satisfy the demands of the ethical and religious consciousness. It seemed to make a religious view of life and of the world impossible. "Behold, I go forward, but He is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive Him. On the left hand, where He doth work, but I cannot behold Him; He hideth Himself on the right hand that I cannot see Him." In the writers I have to notice we find an insistence on the facts of the ethical and religious consciousness, the validity of which the prevalent philosophy of the time, and especially Scholten's deterministic theory, seemed to undermine, and in some of them an attempt to rise to a point of view from which faith and philosophy might be reconciled. In the second volume of his *Doctrine of the Reformed Church*, Scholten views what he defines as the material principle of Reformed theology, God's absolute sovereignty, and especially His free grace in Christ Jesus, as the only ground of salvation, in connection with the various ecclesiastical controversies on the subject of grace and freewill. Without following him through these wandering mazes,

I shall merely state his general conclusion, which is, that in every case, both from the point of view of Scripture as the formal principle of Christian truth, and in the light of the philosophy of the time, the advocates of the theory of Divine Grace as being the only ground of faith and salvation were in the right, and their opponents in the wrong. The view of life and of the world, however, which was common to both parties, is no longer ours. He describes it as dualistic and mechanical, while ours, he holds, is monistic and dynamical; and from this higher standpoint Reformed doctrine requires, in some respects, to be stated differently. To show what he means, I shall quote what he says regarding the controversy between Luther and Erasmus on free will. Erasmus defines free will as the power by which man can apply himself to the things that lead to eternal salvation. He illustrates this by a child who has fallen, and is helped to rise by his father, who holds out an apple to him and stretches out his hand. The child cannot rise up by himself, but he can act along with the father or he can refuse his

help. In this illustration Scholten detects the error of semi-Pelagianism in two forms. In the first place, the relation in which the Infinite stands to His creatures is different from that of one creature to another. A tree grows, not by working along with God, as if the growth of a tree were partly the work of the tree and partly God's work, but the tree grows because it has its ground, all throughout, in God. And so it is in certain respects in the moral sphere. That a man does good and that he accepts the gospel has its ground, not in his sharing with God in an act in which, on his part, he is not dependent on God, but in this, that as a rational and moral being he is entirely self-active and yet lives and acts in God. A second error lies in representing the free will as the power of arbitrarily turning either to the good or away from it. If this only meant that a man's act is not the result of physical necessity or animal instinct, but of self-determination and a rational capacity of choosing between good and evil, then Erasmus would be right and Luther wrong. But what Erasmus really means is that man possesses this capacity in the same measure

and at every moment of his life, and, like Pelagius, he fails to take into account the relation between the will and the moral condition. He assumes that the child, at the moment when the father holds out the apple, can will either to stand up or to remain lying on the ground. The child's will is not something hanging in the air. It stands in relation to the nature of the child. It depends on whether he likes apples and would like to have one at that moment. And in the moral sphere, in the same way, the will is inseparable from the moral condition, and while this is evil, man has no power to will the good. Luther and the Reformed theologians were therefore right in holding that both in willing and doing man was entirely dependent upon God. Where they were wrong—St Augustine and Luther being greater sinners, he holds, in this respect, than the Reformed theologians—was in representing the operation of divine grace in a mechanical way, and this error he traces to their view of human nature, which leaves to man, as he puts it, nothing that can be redeemed. If their error was in leaving to man nothing that can

be redeemed, in developing his monistic and dynamical principle, Scholten may be said to leave in man nothing to be redeemed from. Our ethical and our religious experience in its ethical aspect, is emptied of the significance that we feel usually compelled to attach to it, and the process becomes more marked as Scholten goes on. In his earlier work some problems are left as unsolved. In his later book on Free Will, "by the acceptance of monism and the recognition of the homogeneity of God and nature, God and man, we come to see that for faith there are no contradictions. As darkness is the absence of light, so sin is the absence of the good—an imperfect condition, necessary and inevitable in the development of human nature. In the dictionary of human wisdom expressions like evil and sin have their place. But for the pure, all-embracing glance of the Eternal they lose their significance." A Dutch poet, De Génestet, has written, with humour and sometimes deep pathos, a series of short pointed poems on what was going on around him in the theological world. In one of them he compares Scholten—"the mighty

monist"—to a spider in whose web he felt himself inextricably caught, a comparison with which Scholten said he could find no fault, except that it made him and not the truth the spider, in whose web he himself had been caught. Of his book on Free Will, De Génestet writes :—

“Thrice have I devoured the book,
Fourteen days have I believed it.”

But not for fourteen days but for about as many years Scholten seems to have exercised a commanding influence on religious thought in Holland. His principal critics in the subject we are now dealing with were La Saussaye and Hoekstra. I have already indicated what seems to be the chief fault in Scholten's system. He uses the terms theistic and organic, but his monistic and dynamical principle is quite inadequate to express what we mean by Christian theism and an organic view of the world. If we turn back to the illustration of Erasmus and to that of Scholten, we may suppose La Saussaye to say : “We are not trees, and we are fathers and sons, with all that that implies.” “While we are not trees,” we may suppose Hoekstra to

say, "there is something in the life of a tree, or at least suggested by it, which Scholten leaves out of view. There is the idea of an end or purpose which, even if we may not be justified in applying it to explain the life of a tree, is absolutely necessary in explaining the phenomena of the moral life." With this point of view Hoekstra associates a theory of psychological indeterminism which, it seems to me, weakens rather than strengthens it, and is not essential to the argument by which he and his school seek to rise from faith in man's moral nature to the belief in a moral world-order.

La Saussaye, on the other hand, discusses the question mainly from a theological point of view. To La Saussaye Scholten seemed to confuse the natural relation between God and the world with the moral. He made no distinction between the immanence of God in nature and in man. He brings causality as it is seen at work in nature over to the psychological sphere, where it is not at home. For this reason he rejects Scholten's deterministic theory, while he holds, at the same time, that a will that is not determined is a contradiction in terms,

He therefore rejects also Hoekstra's theory of periodic indeterminism on the ground that it is just at those times when Hoekstra represents the will as undetermined, that, from a religious point of view, it is most determined. On the abstract psychological question he has no theory. The actual relation between man as a moral being and God he terms one of ethical immanence, and what he means by this I have already attempted to explain in a former lecture. It is the Christian theistic view as expressed in the doctrine of the Trinity. Scholten, he argues, passes from a Deism in which God is outside the world to a Pantheism in which He is identified with it and lost in it, and again from Pantheism to Deism, because he fails to give full force to the Christian doctrine of the Logos and of the Holy Spirit. And it is just because La Saussaye fails, it seems to me, to arrive at any consistent theory regarding the Holy Catholic Church, which is essentially connected with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit—passing, as he does, from the standpoint of the Church to that of individualism, and from individualism to that of the Church—that his

own theology gives no satisfactory explanation of the Christian life and of the distinctively ethical ideas of Christianity. In his book on Scholten he begins with a high view of the Church as "a living body revealing the life of the Holy Ghost in her midst and as forming the individual ethical life." From this point of view he leads us to think of the Church as the channel, and, indeed—as the Holy Spirit is the principle of her life—as the source of divine grace regenerating or imparting new spiritual life to all her members. The relation between God and man we can thus think of as that of a common spiritual life in which we find our true life and therefore our freedom. But in the course of his book he passes to another point of view, and, in his anxiety to remove everything in the shape of human mediatorship or intervention between God and man, the Deism, latent in Calvinism, as one of its elements, comes to the front, and the Christian doctrine of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit falls into the background. If it cannot be said that La Saussaye succeeded in forming any clear and consistent theory regarding the Church, it can be

said, at least, that he led his countrymen to consider a subject that required consideration, and that would seem to require consideration even more so at the present time, when other socialistic forces of a frankly non-religious character are asserting themselves in that country.

In Hoekstra Scholten found an antagonist who adopted a different line of attack, and was the earliest of the Dutch theologians who are known as ethical idealists. In his book on Scholten he starts from what Scholten regarded as the determining power in human action, not an abstract will, but what he terms the moral condition of the man. This is ultimately determined, according to Scholten, by a power, self-conscious and absolutely good, immanent and working in nature and history. This assumption Hoekstra puts aside. The idea of God is not given immediately in experience, but is the outcome of a long and slow development. He held that all our knowledge comes from experience in the form of feeling. In experience self-consciousness is awakened. In ascribing the determining power in human action to the moral condition, Scholten neglects to look at

this in the light of the fact of self-consciousness that accompanies it. On this fact Hoekstra bases a theory of self-determination, which leaves open, at certain periods in moral development, not merely freedom to choose between possible motives, in the light of a moral end, but, as far as I can understand him, he holds that at certain periods of the moral life we cannot be said to be determined by the moral end that becomes the determining principle of the moral life. So far, however, Hoekstra did good service by insisting on the fact that moral phenomena can only be explained in the light of a teleological principle, and that there was one sphere of reality at least that was not under the sole dominion of the law of cause and effect. From faith in man's moral nature Hoekstra and his school thought we could pass to faith in a moral world-order, even if the actual world cried out against it. We are not to suppose that the moral ideal exists in the Divine Mind just as it does in ours, but we can believe that there is a Supreme Righteousness and Love at work in nature and in history, which corresponds in some intel-

ligible way to our own moral ideal. In this way it was supposed that we could satisfy the demand of the religious consciousness for a God who is near and not far off. The centre of our own life is identified, in some sense, with the centre of the universe in which we live. Ethical idealism is not, strictly speaking, an apologetic school. The dominant school of thought against which it was directed accepted the belief in a God who was absolutely good, but it seemed to leave no place for human goodness, or efforts after goodness, in the heart of man, which could be regarded as a meeting-place between God and man. This theory was therefore not designed primarily to be an argument for the existence of God, but to bring God and man into immediate relationship. We may sympathise with the end they had in view and yet not be able to accept their theoretical statement. Faith in human goodness—in our moral ideals—is inseparably connected with faith in God ; but we do not pass, I think, from faith in human goodness to faith in a divine goodness, but the latter is always the ground in thought of the former. Ethical faith is always

based on religious faith. The Christian idea of God, as Hoekstra says, is the outcome of a long and slow process, but so also, as he holds, are Christian ethical ideals, and faith in the latter seems to require, as its ground, faith in a Power not ourselves, who has been working in human history and in social life, and revealing to us and in us the ideals that become the determining principle of our moral life. In a series of articles on Mill's *Utilitarianism*, written in 1865, after his book on Scholten, Hoekstra discusses the moral problem from a social point of view. Apart from social life, Hoekstra shows that the individual has no moral character at all. Our own happiness, he argues, and that of others, cannot be placed side by side as two distinct motives that may influence us. The individual exists in organic unity with his fellow-men, and the idea of duty he derives from a vague feeling of organic unity without a clear consciousness of it. If moral ideas have no significance apart from social life, and if moral ideals have been developed in the course of history, *that* faith in our moral nature, on which the ethical idealists

base their faith in God, would seem itself to imply and demand a faith in God, who reveals Himself in history and in social life, and in the Christian Church, from which, as a matter of fact, we derive our ethical ideals.

For some years Hoekstra's position seems to have been a somewhat isolated one. It was not until a few years before the seventies began that the ethical revolt came to a head, and a ten years' conflict took place between the Ethicals and the Intellectualists, as they were called. Among the orthodox theologians of the time there is one whose name must be mentioned in connection with this split in the ranks of the Modernists. This was Dr Cramer, who was a divinity professor at Groningen and afterwards at Utrecht. In the ecclesiastical as well as the theological controversies of the time he played a prominent part. Nicolaas Beets boasted that he was no party man and stood aloof from them. Cramer entered into them without any of the spirit of partisanship. He had the faculty of discerning the really vital points in a question and of stating his views clearly, and his writings, in which he

dealt with Scholten's ethical determinism in connection with the facts of the moral and religious consciousness, seem to have had considerable influence on Scholten's followers. Another writer who ought to be mentioned in the same connection is Professor van der Wijck, who succeeded Opzoomer as Professor of Philosophy at Utrecht. For a good many years he followed closely in the steps of his revered master, but about the time this theological controversy arose—possibly influenced by it and certainly influencing it—he was led to completely change his philosophical position and to adopt one which was inspired in the main by Kant. His principle scientific work is on Psychology, and he is a writer who has had much influence on the intellectual life of Holland during the last quarter of the century.

Ethical Idealism assumed a variety of phases, which may be reduced, I think, to two general forms. The first was that adopted by Hoekstra, and he was followed by his pupil De Bussy and by the Leiden Professors Rouwenhoff and Oort. The second is represented by Van

Hamel and Bruining. But, as Pfleiderer remarks in referring to Dutch Ethical Idealism in connection with similar contemporary schools in Germany, the distinction between writers like De Bussy and Van Hamel is a very fluid one. It is not clear what relation is supposed to exist by the former class of thinkers between the ethical ideal, which is objectified, and believed to correspond to a reality which we can only clothe in a poetical form, and the actual world of nature and history as they are studied scientifically. Anti-supernaturalism was the starting-point of Modernism in Holland, and by this they understood a view of life and of the world that excluded any principle of explanation except the law of cause and effect. This law acted upon them, as Cramer put it, like an enchanter's wand. The Ethical Modernists found that it could not explain moral phenomena, and here they were led to adopt a teleological principle. According to their own definition of naturalism this was to take up a supernatural standpoint with regard to one class of facts. But the term supernatural was one they refused to accept.

In its place Hoekstra was the first to introduce the term supersensible. The ethical ideal, projected out of us, corresponds to a supersensible reality, which stands in some relation to the sensible world, and can only be expressed in the language of poetry. They seem to have had the notion that a teleological principle and a causal principle must exclude each other. But if both are present in ethical experience, and necessary to explain it, which seems to be the case, it is at least possible to believe that both may be present in the world of nature, and both must be present in the sphere of human history. If we can start from an ethical ideal, which is supposed, in the first place, to be purely human, and pass in thought to an objective, supersensible reality corresponding to it, which, as I have said, I do not think we can do; and if we exclude, like the present group of ethical idealists, a dualistic view of the relation between God and the world, we must think of that relation under the form of a divine end or purpose, realising itself in nature and history. In other words, we must regard the world in which

we live and on which we look out, from a supernatural point of view, and see in every event a supernatural significance, and especially in those events to which we can trace the historical origin of the ethical ideals, that we accept as the fullest revelation of the mind and purpose of God. That this group of thinkers did not take the position I have indicated may have been due to the consciousness that the idea of God as the projection out of ourselves of a merely human ethical ideal was too weak a support on which to hang the meaning of a universe of which we know so little, in which there is much that seems to contradict our ethical ideals, and, perhaps, little that seems to confirm them. And it was this feeling that led the second group of thinkers I have now to notice to turn aside from it altogether, and to look for the Divine only in the inner life, the feelings of the heart, the strivings of the will. If our experience of the outer world, and if science and philosophy can give us no knowledge of a loving God, we must give up all speculation regarding the cause and end of the great world.

Religion must be freed from metaphysics. To Kuenen's objection that there could be no religion without the recognition of a Higher Power on whom we feel dependent, and to whom we look for help, Bruining replied in 1877 by an attempt to show that the attitude of his school was justified historically—that they were returning to the good old way. In antiquity religion was the recognition of gods who stood in a moral relation to man, and the view of God as the ground-cause of all things, was originally philosophy, and not religion. The oldest Greek philosophers sought the cause of the world outside the gods, without consciously deviating from the ruling religion. In India Brama is the foundation of the world, but the Devas are the objects of worship. The essence of the Divine he defines as an ideal Power that corresponds to man's highest wants and ideals; and again, in reply to Rouwenhoff, who found this somewhat vague, that the power that takes the place of the Godhead is the *drang* or impulse towards an ethical end. In 1879 Van Hamel published a Critical Essay on the doctrine of

Divine Providence. Religion and philosophy, he holds, must be clearly distinguished. In every religious representation there is a metaphysical element, but this is never the principal one. The principal element has its ground in something that life needs—an ideal *levens-behoefte*—or in an experience of the heart, which is for the most part poetically formulated. The doctrine of providence is a mingling of a pure religious experience with philosophical speculation. The religious experience which lies at its foundation is the blessing which accompanies the earnest pursuit of duty, and the increased feeling of power and the satisfaction which it brings to us. The doctrine of providence, as usually stated, gives too little from a religious point of view and too much from a philosophical. It is defective religion and bad philosophy. It is too positive and bold as an explanation of the world, and, looked at in the light of religious experience, it does not give all that is required.

In passing from Ethical Idealism to another form of thought known as Ethical Orthodoxy, I remark that one may not agree with the

ethical idealists, and yet feel bound to admit that their views contain a certain measure of truth which may serve to correct equally one-sided views. Religion is certainly not philosophy, nor, we may add, is it social ethics, with which, perhaps, there is a tendency at present to identify it. Religious thinkers seem to find some difficulty in giving a general definition of religion. Probably most of them agree in regarding it as worship, primarily in an emotional form, and as having its inner shrine in the heart of man. But if the emotion is not to be a mere blank, it must derive its character from the world on which we look out, whether this is interpreted poetically or scientifically, and if we are to give the emotion or impulse or effort any signification that can be termed ethical, we must think of ourselves as existing along with our fellow-creatures in some kind of social union, which in the same way gives character to the ethical emotion. The object that we worship, in other words, is mediated by the world on which we look out and by social life in its historical development—in the Christian religion by the Christian

Church. It is from this point of view that I propose to look at the ethical "orthodox" school, for its tendency has been to concentrate religious thought on the question of divine revelation, and especially on the historical revelation in Jesus Christ. I need not say that the group of writers I have in view do not arrogate to themselves the designation orthodox; but the word is commonly used to distinguish them from the Ethical Modernists. Professor van Nes, who was recently appointed by the Dutch Church to the chair of Dogmatics at Leiden, defines dogmatics—following La Saussaye—as an account for the intellect of what the Church knows she possesses in her faith, and the science of dogmatics depends on the philosophy of the time. It is not an historical science, but, if so, it has a living history. Whoever will say now the same thing as was said in former times must say it differently. If he says the same thing he says something different. If one may be permitted to put the criticism in the mouths of the theologians of Dr Kuyper's school—it is not how they would put it, but as it occurs to one in trying to understand their

position—they would say, only they would say it more strongly, that Professor van Nes's statement is too sweeping. The recent history of religious thought in Holland had shown conclusively that the dominant philosophy of the time was quite inadequate to explain the facts of the religious life, or, as they would put it, was inconsistent with the objective Word of God. From the theologian's point of view philosophy is merely the handmaid of faith. Any help she can bring is to be gratefully accepted, but she may offer what is of no use or what must be rejected as incompatible, not with the doctrine of the Church, but with the Word of God, or, as it might also be put, with what this school speaks of as the facts of the religious life which the theologians of former times have attempted, however imperfectly, to express in the form of doctrine. The standpoint of the ethical school is that the deposit of faith has always been the same in the Church. "Faith is a divine gift," says Professor van Nes, "and theology must start from the Divine Giver and not the abstract ideas of speculative philosophy." What I have to notice, however, is the

difficulty the ethical theologians seem to find in expressing the Christian faith in any doctrinal form. Thirty years before this, in 1878, Professor Valetton, in an article on the Ethical Principle, wrote that doctrine can be reformed, and this we will try to do with all our power, and, as it seemed to him then, an entirely new system of doctrine was forming. I have already quoted Professor Chantepie de la Saussaye's remark in his *Geestelijke Stroomingen*—Spiritual Currents:—"Perhaps the hour has not yet come to build up a new system. . . . We must wait on the Lord." One thing that seems to stand in their way is their strong individualistic standpoint, or rather their insistence on the personal element in religion. In an interesting essay, in which the Leiden professor contrasts the French and English character, he asks, "Is individualism passing away to be lost in some kind of solidarity?" In English writers, who are often sceptical as to intellectual formulas, he finds an undercurrent of spiritual earnestness which is not to be found in France, where *l'homme formule* is the type. Voltaire was a convinced Deist, but what remains is his hideous

smile. There is little that can be called intellectual scepticism in Renan. Everything is possible—even God, but what is wanting in him is a feeling of the deep earnestness of life. There was something impersonal-superficial—connected with the intellect rather than the moral life in his leaving the Church. What he admires in the English character, he finds notably in the case of Tennyson, and it was no fault in him that he remained outside the democratic stream of modern life, which may be a whim of short duration. At the same time the ethical theologians clearly recognise the fact that the life and faith of the Church cannot be explained from a subjective or individualistic standpoint. “The absolute that faith demands,” says Professor Ch. de la Saussaye in another essay, “is not to be found in inner experience, nor in abstract ideas, nor in mysticism, but in an historical revelation in Jesus Christ. In Him, the Absolute in history, the Eternal in time—in the real objective movement of history I interpret this to mean, and not in the region of ideas. Their position, as well as that of the elder La Saussaye, would therefore seem to be

analogous to that of the early Church with regard to Gnosticism, only in seeking to define it they lay stress on the personal rather than on the collective consciousness of the Church. In noticing the reaction from nature and reason as sources of the knowledge of God, Professor Ch. de La Saussaye remarks that it was not from Agnosticism that Ritschl rejected natural theology, but because it is in the sphere of historical revelation that we meet the living God. So far he is in sympathy with Ritschl, while he does not agree with him in seeking to exclude philosophy from theology, and here, he says, he finds himself in good company, mentioning a name revered in this university, that of Edward Caird. It is not easy to see how they can reconcile their virtually Christocentric standpoint with their critical views regarding the Gospels. In a sense all Christian theology is Christocentric, and all theologians would agree with them in regarding Christ as the centre of history and the centre of the moral universe; but when they concentrate divine revelation in the historical revelation in Jesus Christ, while they admit that we have no trust-

worthy historical records of it, they seem to me to take up a position from which it is impossible to build up a system that can explain the faith and life of the Church, and that the old lines which the Church has laid down in the Trinitarian formula and in the doctrine of the Incarnate Logos seem to afford an infinitely more satisfactory basis. In my last lecture I noticed the position of this school with regard to Old Testament literature. With regard to New Testament criticism I think it may be said of most of the writers I have in view at present that they would not attach much if any historical value in the ordinary sense to the Gospel records. Here, too, criticism, like the wind in the cave of the Sibyl, has disturbed the leaves and sent them fluttering in the hollow cavern. "There are no contemporary accounts," said the elder Valetton, "we have merely popular tales, the sources of which are unknown, and yet Jesus was his Christ and Saviour." There is no reason, Professor Valetton holds, why tradition—a saga or myth—should not convey the Word of God to us as well as strict history.

If we would distinguish the ethical orthodox

theologians from the ethical modernist school and connect the former with the last school I have to mention—and much more briefly than I had proposed doing—which represents the extreme right or left of orthodoxy in Holland, it might be said that they accept fundamentally the Reformed doctrine of revelation, that the Word of God is revealed, so to speak, from without or from above—declared, as our Confession puts it, to the Church, and as such sovereign and authoritative. In principle La Saussaye was as much anti-revolutionary as Groen van Prinsterer or Dr Kuyper. It was about the beginning of the last quarter of the century that Dr Kuyper succeeded Groen as leader of the Confessional and anti-revolutionary party. As a youth he felt no special vocation for the Church, and if he had had his own will, would have been a sailor. At Leiden, and when he entered on his first cure of souls in the country, he was still a Modernist, but some incidents in his life had already turned his thoughts in the direction of the creed of the Dutch fathers. One was the discovery of the works of Johannes à Lasco, which he needed

for a university dissertation, in a private library, where nobody knew they were to be found, after having hunted all over Holland and failed to find them. In this he saw the finger of God. The crowning touch was given by his pastoral intercourse with his Calvinistic flock. The subject of the dissertation—it is interesting to notice—was a comparison of the views of Calvin and à Lasco on the doctrine regarding the Church, and Dr Kuyper is an ecclesiastic, I think, rather than a theologian, although he has written many theological works. Possibly it was from his early study of à Lasco that he derived the doctrine of general and special grace which plays an important part in the theology of the Free University of Amsterdam. But my time is up, and that is a subject which I gladly bequeath to some future Hastie Lecturer.

I can only notice in a word one or two outstanding points in Dr Kuyper's career. The reorganisation of the theological faculties in 1876 led the way to the foundation of the Free University, which was to be independent both of Church and State. This, Dr Kuyper held, was a return to the original mediæval idea of

a university. At the same time it is based in all its faculties on the principles of the Reformed Church as represented by the Formularies of Unity. The refusal of the Dutch Church to admit its students into the clerical office led in turn to the *Doleantie*, a peculiar form of dissent analogous in some respects to the attitude of the Jansenists towards the Church of Rome. The Dutch Church was a Church, not false but degenerate, and to leave it and join another communion would involve the guilt of schism. Dr Kuyper's followers, therefore, who formed separate congregations, still regarded themselves as members of the Dutch Church, and looked forward to a return to the mother Church. When it was proposed to unite with the Christian Reformed Church, which had seceded, as we have seen, on similar grounds some two generations earlier, and regarded the National Church as false and not merely degenerate, this distinction led to much discussion. Under the influence of Dr Kuyper's commanding personality the obstacle proved to be not insurmountable, and in 1892 the union was consummated. So far as I can learn, it has

not been an ideally happy one—such unions, like marriage, would seem to have to spring from an impulse which, like divine grace, is irresistible. The idea of a political coalition between Dr Kuyper's party and the Roman Catholics originated, not with Dr Kuyper, but with a priest of the Church of Rome, who, like Dr Kuyper, had become a member of the Dutch Parliament. I am glad to have an opportunity of mentioning Dr Schaepman's name before I close. He was a man who was deeply interested in social questions, and he was a man of literary eminence and a true poet, and manliness—a quality which is not too prominent in much recent Dutch literature—is the impression that the little I know of Schaepman's work has left upon my mind. If the possession of ideas—as my old Göttingen fellow-pupil holds—is all-important in statecraft, Dr Kuyper is certainly not lacking in ideas, and it would be a great mistake to suppose, because he is identified with what many have come to regard as an outworn creed, that he is not a man of wide and far-reaching views. The determining factor in the development of theology seems to him

to be the political and social factor, as indeed, in some primitive form, it seems to have been the determining factor when man first awoke to a consciousness of the Divine. The atheism, which he traces to the influence of the French Revolution, and the pantheism, which he ascribes to the influence of German speculation, are a political and social atheism and pantheism, against which, with what result has yet to be seen, he holds up the standard of Calvinism.

Whether the present political coalition may lead in time to a closer ecclesiastical and theological *rapprochement*, or whether the course of events—the growth of materialistic socialism—may lead to a more pronounced moral individualism, which, whatever else it may be, is not Christianity—these are questions that lie beyond the province of an historian.

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